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MADE IN AMERICA FOR EUROPEAN TAX:
THE INTERNAL CONSISTENCY TEST
Rum MASON*
Abstract: The European Court of Justice ("ECJ") has come under in-
creasing criticism for overstepping its institutional authority in tax cases
by invalidating national tax regimes that are not discriminatory. This Arti-
cle offers an explanation for the ECJ's difficulties in tax cases. "Overlap-
ping taxation" —the simultaneous exercise of tax jurisdiction by two states
in cross-border tax cases—tends to create real, but nondiscriminatory,
cross-border tax disadvantages that the ECJ may mistake for discrimina-
tion. When the ECJ mistakenly invalidates nondiscriminatory tax legisla-
tion, it encroaches on the tax sovereignty of the European Union mem-
ber states and undermines their tax policy goals. To address this problem,
this Article proposes that the ECJ adopt the "internal consistency test" in
tax cases. Under this approach, developed by the U.S. Supreme Court to
analyze state tax discrimination claims under the Dormant Commerce
Clause, the ECJ would ask: If all twenty-seven member states enacted the
challenged rule, would intra-Community commerce bear a burden that
purely domestic commerce would not also bear? This Article shows how
use of this test could reduce the risk of judicial error in tax cases, thereby
deferring to member state tax autonomy while potentially fostering mar-
ket integration.
INTRODUCTION
There is no tax controversy more dramatic than that concerning
what role the European Court of Justice should play in forming Euro-
pean tax policy. Only in the European Union ("EU") have states with
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such a long history of independence ceded so much control over
their tax systems to a central government. No other states have toler-
ated such extensive review of national tax laws by an international
court. Though many states have agreed in trade treaties to substantive
restrictions on their ability to impose indirect taxes on international
commerce, states invariably carve out exceptions for direct tax meas-
ures,' and it is easy to see why: no state is willing to subject its income
tax revenue stream, the very lifeblood of domestic policy, to external
review.
Thus far, most of the influence exerted by the EU central govern-
ment on member state income tax policy has been through review by
the European Court ofJustice ("ECJ" or the Court) of national tax laws
for compatibility with the Treaty Establishing the European Community
("EC Treaty"). 2 A member state discriminates in violation of the EC
Treaty when it taxes cross-border economic activities 3 or cross-border
income more than similar domestic activities or income." For example,
a member state would violate the EC Treaty if it subjected residents of
other member states to higher tax rates than its own residents. 5 It
would also violate the EC Treaty for a member state to deny to nonresi-
dents tax benefits granted to similarly situated residents. 6 The EC
1 Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination Against International Commerce, 54 TAX
L REv. 131, 132-33 (2001). The Article concerns only direct taxes, viz., those for which
legal liability and economic burden fall on the same person. Direct taxes include personal
income taxes; corporate income taxes are usually also considered under the rubric of di-
rect taxes. Indirect taxes, whose economic burden is shifted from the person with the li-
ability for remitting the tax to another person, include value-added taxes, and they are
subject to extensive EC legislation. See, e.g., Council Directive 2008/7/EC, art. 1, Concern-
ing Indirect Taxes on the Raising of Capital, 2008 O.J. (L 46) 11 (EU); Council Directive
2006/112/EC, On the Common System of Value Added Tax, 2006 0j. (L 347) 1 (EU).
2 See generally Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Commu-
nity arts. 91-93, Mar. 25, 1997, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
3 This Article uses the term "cross-border economic activities" to describe economic
activities with connections to more than one EU member state—in other words, intra-
Community commerce.
4 See Case C-279/93, Finanzamt K.Oln-Altstadt ti. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. 1.225, 1 30
("[D]iscrimination can arise only through the application of different rules to comparable
situations or the application of the same rule to different situations."). See generally Rum
MASON, PRIMER ON DIRECT TAXAllON IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2005), The Eqf has ac-
cepted a limited number of public policy justifications for tax discrimination. See id. at 93-
114.
5 See, e.g., Case C-311/97, Royal Bank of Scot. plc v. Greece, 1999 E.C.R. 1-2651, 1 34
(holding that Greece discriminated when it taxed domestic banks at 35%, but branches of
foreign banks at 40%).
6 See, e.g.. Schumacher, 1995 E.C.R. 1-225, 1 59 (holding that under certain circumstances,
source states must allow nonresident taxpayers the same personal tax deductions as resident
taxpayers).
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Treaty forbids such tax discrimination because it hampers economic
integration in Europe.?
Beginning with the first ECJ direct tax case in 1986, EU taxpayers
have been overwhelmingly successful in their tax discrimination suits
against EU member states, 8 and the revenue impact of ECJ tax cases has
been significant. 9 A decision by, the ECJ that a national tax provision
violates the EC Treaty affects national budgets in three ways. First, the
member state may no longer use the discriminatory provision to raise
revenue, which means that to balance its budget it must either cut
spending or increase the revenue raised by other taxes. 1 ° Second, deci-
sions of the ECJ are generally retroactive, so that the member state is
obliged to refund with interest any discriminatory taxes already col-
lected." Finally, the effect of a decision by the ECJ is not limited to the
defendant member state. 12 The ECJ's interpretation of European
7 See EC Treaty arts. 2-3. See generally MASON, supra note 4.
8 See generally Case 270/83, Comm'n v. France (avoir fiscal), 1986 E,C.R. 273. Of the forty-
nine direct tax discrimination cases decided between 1986 and the end of 2005, the defen-
dant member state won in only nine cases (and in two of those cases the taxpayer also won
some issues). See Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer plc v. Halsey, 2005 E.C.R. 1-10837, 1 59;
Case C-512/03, Blanckaert v. Inspecteur Van de Belastingdienst/Particulieren/
Ondernemingen Buitenland to Heerlen, 2005 E.C.R. 1-7685, 1 51; Case C-376/03, D. v. In-
specteur van de Belastingdienst, 2005 E.C.R. 1-5821, 1 63; Case C403/03, Schempp v. Finan-
zamt Milnchen, 2005 E.C.R. 1-642, 1 43; Case C-391/97, Frans Gschwind v. Finanzamt
Aachen-AuBenstadt, 1999 E.C.R. 1-5451, 1 32; Case C-336/96, Gilly v. Directeur des Services
Fiscaux du Bas-Rhin, 1998 E.C.R. 1-2793, 11 53-54; Case C-250/95, Futura Participations SA
v. Administration des Contributions, 1997 E.C.R. 1-2471, 1 43; Case C-300/90, Comm'n
Belgium, 1992 E.C.R. 1-305, 1 24; Case C-204/90, Hanns-Martin Bachmann v. Belgian State,
1992 E.C.R. 1-249, 1 35.
9 For example, Marks & Spencer concerned tax losses of over $200 million for a single
U.K. corporate group. See Marks ce Spencer, 2005 E.C.R. 1-10837. In another recent case, the
United Kingdom requested that the ECJ limit the temporal effects of its judgment, because
settling claims arising from a British tax provision enacted in 1974 would cost the govern-
ment an estimated £7 billion. Case C-446/04, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litig. (Franked
Investment Income), 2006 E.C.R. 1-11753, 1 144 (opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed).
1 ° See EC Treaty art. 228 ("If the Court of Justice fords that a Member State has failed
to fulfill an obligation under this Treaty, the State shall be required to take the necessary
measures to comply with the judgment of the Court of Justice.").
" See, e.g., Case C-294/99, Athinaiki Zithopiia AE (Athens Breweries) v. Greek State,
2001 E.C.R. I-0769,1 35; MASON, supra note 4, at 21.
12 Although there is no formal doctrine of stare decisis in the ECJ, the procedural
rules of the Court allow it to decide a preliminary ruling case by reasoned order rather
than a formal opinion if resolution of the question "may be clearly deduced from existing
case-law.' Codified Version of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Communities, art. 104 § 3, 2001 O.J. (C 34) 1 [hereinafter Rules of Procedure]. Ad-
ditionally, the Court cites its own precedent in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Case C-385/00,
De Groot v. Staatssecretaris van FinanciEn, 2002 E.C.R. 1-11819, 77. And member states
with tax laws similar to those found by the ECJ to be inconsistent with EC law often amend
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Community ("EC") law binds all the member states for that issue. 13 The
budgetary impact of ECJ tax cases, as well as their centrality in defining
the personal entitlements of EU nationals, makes it important for the
ECJ to get its tax cases "right."
EU member states' willingness to continue to subject national in-
come tax laws to review by the ECJ is uncertain. Member state tax ad-
ministrators and tax academics have criticized the Court for overreach-
ing in tax cases—particularly for finding discrimination where there
was none." The Court's tax jurisprudence is so controversial that dur-
ing negotiations over the proposed European Constitution, member
state representatives considered stripping the ECJ of jurisdiction over
tax cases. 15 Although this drastic change did not survive in the final
draft of the constitution, the member states are clearly sensitive to judi-
cial incursions into this sacrosanct area of national sovereignty.
This Article explains why tax cases are especially challenging for
the ECJ. International tax law recognizes the right of two different
states to tax the same item of cross-border income. 16 The state in
which the owner of the income resides (the "residence state") may tax
the income, and the state where the income arises (the "source state")
may also tax it. Such "overlapping taxation" 17 makes it difficult for the
Court to identify tax discrimination because overlapping taxation
causes "negative disparities," nondiscriminatory tax disadvantages that
stem from differences in tax rates and definitions of taxable income
their laws without waiting for a separate challenge of their own law. See generally THE ACTE
CLAIR IN EC DIRECT TAX LAW (Ana Paula Dourado & Ricardo da Palma Borges eds., 2008)
(giving state-by-state analysis of the role of the acte clairdoctrine in tax cases).
" See Rules of Procedure, supra nate 12, art. 104 § 3.
14 See, e.g., John F. Avery Jones, Carry on Discriminating, 6 BRIT. TAX REV. 525, 527
(1995); Michael J. Gram & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination and the Political
and Economic Integration of Europe, 115 YALE L.J. 1186, 1186 (2006); Luc Hinnekens, Euro-
pean Court Goes for Robust Tax Principles for Treaty Freedoms. What About Reasonable Exceptions
and Balances?, 13 EC TAX REV. 65, 67 (2004); Ruth Mason, U.S. Tax Treaty Policy and the
European Court of Justice, 59 TAX L. Ray. 65, 89 (2005); Servaas van Thiel, The Future of the
Principle of Non-Discrimination in the EU: Towards a Right to Most Favored Nation Treatment and
a Prohibition of Double Burdens?, in COMPARATIVE FISCAL FEDERALISM 331, 399 (Reuven Avi-
Yonah et al. eds„ 2007); Peter J. Wattel, Progressive Taxation of Nonresidents and lntra-EC Allo-
cation of Personal Tax Allowances: Why Schumacker, Asscher, Gilly and Gschwind Do Not Suf-
fice, 40 EUR. TAX'N 210, 210 (2000); Dennis Weber, In Search of a (New) Equilibrium Between
Tax Sovereignty and the Freedom of Movement Within the EC, 34 INTERTAx 585, 594 (2006).
15 See Frans Vanistendael, The ECJ at the Crossroads: Balancing Tax Sovereignty Against the
Imperatives of the Single Market, 2006 FUR, TAX'N 413, 413.
16 See Peggy B. Musgrave, Sovereignty, Entitlement, and Cooperation in International Taxa-
tion, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1335, 1336-37, 1341-42 (2001).
17 See infra notes 62-73 and accompanying text (distinguishing "overlapping taxation"
from unrelieved "juridical double taxation").
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between the source and residence states.° For example, a taxpayer
from a low-tax state suffers a cross-border tax disadvantage by investing
in a high-tax state. Such tax disparities are inevitable because national
tax systems in the EU are not harmonized.° And because the EC Treaty
does not require tax harmonization, the ECJ has held that tax dispari-
ties do not violate the EC Treaty, even when they discourage cross-
border economic activity."
Although the Court has held that tax disparities do not violate the
EC Treaty because they are an unavoidable byproduct of retained tax
autonomy, the Court has trouble distinguishing between tax disadvan-
tages arising from disparities and tax disadvantages arising from dis-
crimination. 21 When the ECJ mistakenly invalidates nondiscriminatory
tax legislation, it unnecessarily constrains member states' tax policy de-
cisions, These errors could ultimately jeopardize the ECJ's ability to re-
view tax cases by pushing the member states to curtail the Court's direct
tax jurisdiction.
But stripping the ECJ of its tax jurisdiction could compromise the
European goal of economic integration. Because EU-level tax legislation
requires the unanimous agreement of the twenty-seven member states,
there is little EU tax legislation. 22 As a result, of all the EU institutions,
the ECJ presently plays the most important role in promoting income
tax cohesiveness in Europe by striking down national tax provisions that
discriminate against infra-Community commerce. Reflecting the im-
portance of this function, tax cases represent about ten percent of the
ECJ's jurisprudence, and the number of tax cases decided by the Court
each year is growing. 23 The role of the ECJ in tax cases can be seen as
13 See infra notes 80-98 and accompanying text.
13 See, e.g., Case C-403/03, Schempp r. Finanzamt Munchen, 2005 E.C.R. 1-6421,1 34.
20 see,	id.
21 See infra notes 40-116 and accompanying text.
22 See EC Treaty art. 93; MASON, supra note 4, at 9.
33 See, e.g., COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUR. CMTYS., ANNUAL REPORT 2006, at 84 (2007). All-
nual statistics providing subject matter breakdowns of the ECJ's decisions show that taxation has
consistently constituted about 10% of the Court's decisions since 1997, the First year for which
statistics are available. See ANNUAL REPORT 2006, supra, at 84; COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUR.
CMTYS., ANNUAL REPORT 2005, at 195 (2006); COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EU R. CMTYS., ANNUAL
REPORT 2004, at 171 (2005); COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUR. CMTYS., ANNUAL REPORT 2003, at
219 (2004); COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUR, CMTYS., ANNUAL REPORT 2002, at 159 (2003);
COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUR. CMTYS., ANNUAL REPORT 2001, at 246 (2002); COURT OF JUS-
TICE OF THE EUR. CMTYS., ANNUAL REPORT 2000, at 244 (2001); COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUR.
CMTYS., ANNUAL REPORT 1999, at 226 (2000); COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUR. CMTYS., ANNUAL
REPORT 1998 (1999), at 189; ANNUAL REPORT OF THE. COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUR. CMTYS.
1997, at 169 (1998). The number of tax cases decided each year has increased from twenty-eight
decided tut cases in 1997 to fifty-one decided uses in 2006, See ANNUAL REPORT 2006, supra, at
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analogous to that of the U.S. Supreme Court, which helped forge the
American union by striking down discriminatory state taxes under the
Dormant Commerce Clause. 24
Although they recognize the importance of the role of the ECJ,
commentators also understand that overlapping taxation creates diffi-
culties in analyzing tax cases. To address these difficulties, commenta-
tors have offered—and the ECJ has sometimes adopted—the so-called
"per-country" and "overall" approaches to resolving tax cases. 25 For rea-
sons described at length in Part II, this Article rejects both of these
standard approaches as inadequate to the challenges posed by an in-
ternational tax setting in which more than one state taxes a single item
of cross-border income. 26 Instead of these approaches, this Article of-
fers a new analytical framework for tax discrimination cases. 27
Because tax disparities arise from differences in the member
states' tax laws, there would be no tax disparities if the member states'
tax laws were harmonized. Therefore, when evaluating a national tax
provision for compatibility with the EC Treaty under the internal con-
sistency test proposed in this Article, the Court should first apply what I
call the "harmony constraint," under which it would assume that every
member state applied the challenged tax rule. 28 If the relevant ,cross-
border tax disadvantage remains after application of the harmony con-
straint, the Court can safely conclude that the disadvantage was not
caused by disparities, and it should closely scrutinize the law for dis-
crimination. Thus, rather than positively identifying discrimination, the
main virtue of the internal consistency test is that it provides a reliable
way to rule out the possibility that a disparity caused the tax disadvan-
tage. By filtering out disparities, internal consistency could help the
Court avoid infringing member state tax autonomy by reducing the
likelihood that the ECJ would invalidate disparate, but nondiscrimina-
tory, legislation. Although this approach would be new for Europe, the
84; ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supm, at 169. The Annual Reports do not indicate how many of these
cases were direct tax discrimination cases. See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT 2006, supm, at 84. But see
European Commission, ECJ (and cm Cases in the Fteld of or of Partietdar Intern, for, Direct Taxation
(Capital Duty Inclusive) (Eur. Commission, Brussels, Belg.), August 28,2008, at 6-8 available at
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/common/infringemen  ts/case_
law/court_cases direct_taxation_en.pdf (showing only thirty-three direct tax cases decided in
2006, thus suggesting that the remainder involved indirect taxation).
24 See infra notes 176-177 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 122-145 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 122-161 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 162-198 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 162-189 and accompanying text.
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U.S. Supreme Court has employed a similar approach since the 1980s
in state tax discrimination cases arising under the Dormant Commerce
Clause.29 When the U.S. Supreme Court applies the internal consistency
test, it asks: if all 50 states enacted the challenged rule, would interstate
commerce bear a burden that purely domestic commerce would not
also bear?"
Although the ECJ and tax commentators usually define dispari-
ties to include only cross-border tax disadvantages, unharmonized tax
systems also result in cross-border advantages, or what I call "positive
disparities." For example, a taxpayer from a high-tax state who invests
in a low-tax state may gain a tax advantage on cross-border investment
that is not available for domestic investment. 31 In cases where dispari-
ties between the tax laws of the source and residence states result in a
net cross-border tax advantage; the advantage could obscure the fact
that one of the states actually discriminated against the taxpayer. The
Court's failure to recognize such tax discrimination compromises the
economic integration of the common market as well as the personal
economic freedoms of EU nationals, 32 By eliminating positive tax dis-
parities, the internal consistency test could also help the Court in
cases where compensatory tax advantages offered by one state ob-
scure discrimination by another. 33
The internal consistency test also would simplify a notoriously
complex34 area of EC law by converting the tax discrimination question
from one potentially involving twenty-seven member states to one in-
volving only a single state: the defendant. If every member state applied
the same tax law as the defendant state, the ECJ would never have to
as See generally Walter Hellerstein, Is "Internal Consistency" Dead?: Reflections on an Evolv-
ing Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation, 61 TAX L. REV. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Heller-
stein, Internal Consistency II); Walter Hellerstein, Is "Internal Consistency" Foolish?: Reflections
on an Emerging Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation, 87 kiwi'. L. REV. 138 (1988)
[hereinafter Hellerstein, Internal Consistency I).
See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995) (up-
holding Oklahoma's sales tax on the full price of tickets for interstate bus travel because if
every state enacted such a law, then interstate bus tickets would be taxed only once, in the
state of purchase).
31 See infra notes 80-98 and accompanying text.
. 32 See it 	 notes 80-98 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 99-116 and accompanying text.
94 Case C-374/04, Test Claimants v. Comm'rs of Inland Revenue, 2006 E.C.R. 1-11673,
1 3 (opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed) ("This is an area in which the Court, faced
with increasingly complicated factual and legislative contexts and arguments seeking to
test the limits of the Treaty, has developed a substantial body of rather complex case-law.").
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inquire into the tax laws of any state other than the one before the
Court.
Part I of this Article briefly presents the ECJ's conception of tax
discrimination and shows how overlapping taxation obscures tax dis-
crimination. 35 Part II argues that the overlapping tax dilemma cannot
be resolved by application of the per-country or overall approaches. 36
Part III presents the internal consistency test, shows how it would work
in the EU context, and describes the benefits that could be expected if
the ECJ adopted it. 37 Part III also discusses how differences between
U.S. state taxation and EU member state taxation would make the ap-
proach even more useful in the EU context than in the U.S. context."
Finally, Part IV anticipates and addresses some potential objections to
the internal consistency test."
I. THE OVERLAPPING TAX DILEMMA
A. Tax Discrimination. Under EC Law
The requirement of unanimous agreement among the twenty-
seven member states for tax legislation at the EU level presents a nearly
insurmountable bar to EU-wide tax legislation. 40 As a result, of all the
EU institutions, the ECJ has exerted the greatest influence on direct
taxation. The ECJ hears direct tax cases primarily as references for pre-
liminary ruling, in which national courts refer to the ECJ questions
concerning the compatibility of member state tax laws with EC law. 41 In
the two decades during which it has decided direct tax cases, the ECJ
has developed robust tax nondiscrimination principles.42 Under these
principles, member states may not use their tax systems to discriminate
against EU nationals (including companies) exercising their right to
freedom of movement of goods, services, workers, or capital across
33 See infra notes 40-121 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 122-161 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 162-198 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 189-198 and accompanying text.
39 See infra notes 199-230 and accompanying text.
4° See EC Treaty art. 93.
41 See id. art. 234. Of the thirty-four new tax cases listed in the 2006 Annual Report,
twenty-seven were references for a preliminary ruling while only seven were direct actions.
See ANIYUAL REPORT 2006, supra note 23, at 90. Thus, private litigation by EU taxpayers in
national courts, followed by references by those national courts to the ECJ, has been an
important mechanism for enforcing the EC Treaty's prohibition on tax discrimination.
42 See infra notes 122-160 and accompanying text.
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member state borders.43 Nor may member states create obstacles that
prevent EU nationals from conducting or establishing business across
member state borders."
Before one considers the overlapping tax dilemma, it is useful to
understand the Court's conception of tax discrimination. The Court
has interpreted the EC Treaty to forbid a member state from treating a
taxpayer resident in another member state worse for tax purposes than
a similarly situated resident taxpayer. 45 Impermissible tax discrimina-
tion takes a variety of forms: a state might charge nonresident taxpayers
a higher tax rate than residents on the same economic activity; 46 or a
state could subject nonresidents to a higher tax base than residents. 47
Likewise, a state might subject nonresidents to more onerous tax ad-
ministrative procedures than residents48 or deny nonresidents interest
on tax refunds when interest would be paid to residents. 49 Alternatively,
45 See EC Treaty art. 12 (prohibiting nationality discrimination); id arts. 23-32, 39, 49,
56 (barring cross-border restraints on movement of goods, workers, services, and capital).
44 See id art. 43 (prohibiting restraints on cross-border business establishment). For
purposes of the EC Treaty, companies are considered to have the nationality of the mem-
ber state of their corporate seat. See id. art. 48.
45 Case C-279/93, Finanzamt KOln-Altstadt v. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. 1-225, 1 30. Ac-
cording to the ECJ, a member state engages in tax discrimination when it applies "differ-
ent rules to comparable situations" or "the same rule to different situations." Id. Thus, if
the ECJ determines that a cross-border taxpayer is "similarly situated' to a domestic tax-
payer, the two taxpayers may not be treated differently for tax purposes. See Ruth Mason,
Flunking the Egs Tax Discrimination Test. 46 COLUM. J. TRANsNAT't L. 72, 77, 92-95 (2008)
(arguing that the ECrs explanations for its decisions present no clear conception of tax
discrimination, but arguing that the outcomes of its cases could be understood to mean
that the Court considers, at a minimum, both protectionist taxes and taxes that create
restrictions on outbound activities to violate the EC Treaty). The EC Treaty also prohibits
member states from "restricting" EU nationals' free movement rights, but the Court's tax
restriction jurisprudence is still undeveloped at this point, and it is not clear what restric-
tion analysis would add to the Court's already robust notion of nondiscrimination. See infra
notes 122-160 and accompanying text.
46 See Case C-311/97, Royal Bank of Scot, plc v. Greece, 1999 E.C.R. I-2651,1 34.
47 See Case C-234/01, Gerritse v. Finanzamt Neulthlin-Nord, 2003 E.C.R. 1-5933, 1 55
(holding that a member state could not tax nonresidents on a gross basis when it taxed
similarly situated residents on a net basis, at least in cases where gross basis taxation would
lead to higher taxes than net basis taxation).
48 See Case C-175/88, Biehl v. Administration des Contributions de Luxembourg, 1990
E.C.R. 1-1779,11 18-19 (finding EC Treaty violation where full-year residents were entitled
to automatic tax refunds, whereas partial-year residents first had to participate in an ad-
ministrative procedure).
49 See Case C-330/91, Queen v. Inland Revenue Comm'rs ex parte Commerzbank AG,
1993 E.C.R. 1-4017, 1 20 (finding EC Treaty violation where residents, but not nonresi-
dents, were entitled to interest on tax refunds).
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a state may violate the EC Treaty by granting tax advantages to residents
while denying them to nonresidents."
In addition to preventing host states from discriminating against
nonresidents, the Court has also interpreted the EC Treaty to prevent a
member state from penalizing its own residents' cross-border income
and economic activity in comparison with their domestic income and
activity.51 For example, a member state may not tax dividends received
from companies established in fellow member states more harshly than
domestic dividends. 52 Thus, for EC law purposes, discriminatory taxes
include both those that treat taxpayers worse because they are non-
nationals or nonresidents and those that single out cross-border in-
come for harsher taxation than domestic income.53
Nevertheless, not all cross-border tax disadvantages amount to dis-
crimination. 54 If they did, the nondiscrimination requirement would be
a de facto tax harmonization requirement. For example, if the ECJ
were to hold that every cross-border tax disadvantage violates the EC
Treat); then no member state could have a tax rate higher than that of
the member state with lowest rate. Any rate divergence would mean
that residents of the lowest-tax state would experience cross-border tax
disadvantages, and therefore discrimination, whenever they invested or
did business in another state. Such a broad conception of tax discrimi-
nation would leave no room for variation among member state tax sys-
tems, and it would invade the member states' reserved autonomy to
determine their tax base, tax rates, and rules for asserting tax jurisdic-
tion . 55
The Court refers to cross-border tax disadvantages arising from
unharmonized tax systems as "disparities," and it has explicitly declared
" See, e.g., Case C-264/96, Imperial Chem. Indus. plc v. Colmer, 1998 E.C.R. 1-4695,
1 30 (holding that denial of group loss relief based on corporate residence violated the EC
Treaty); Case C-270/83, Comm'n v. France (avoir fiscal ), 1986 E.C.R. 273, I 55 (holding
that denial of imputation credits based on corporate residence violated the EC Treaty).
" See Case C-315/02, Lenz v Fin anzlandesdirektion far Tirol, 2004 E.C.R. 1-7063,1 49.
" See id.
35 See id.; Gerritse, 2003 E.C.R. 1-5933, 1 55; Royal Bank of Scot., 1999 E.C.R. 1-2651, 134;
Commerzbank, 1993 E.C.R. I-4017,1 20;•Biehl, 1990 E.C.R. 1-1779, 11 18-19.
m See, e.g., Case C-403/03, Schempp v. Finanzamt Wtcher', 2005 E.C.R. 1-6421, 1 34
(finding no discrimination, despite the fact that alimony payments made to recipients
resident in other member states could be subject to higher taxes in Germany than pay-
ments to German recipients).
t The Court has acknowledged this reserved autonomy. See, e.g., Case C-446/04, Test
Claimants in the FQ Group Litig. (Franked Investment Income), 2006 E.C.R. 1-11753, 1 35
( -1131irect taxation fails within [member states'l competence ...."); Schumacher, 1995
E.C.R. 1-225, 1 21 ("LA's Community law stands at present, direct taxation does not as such
fall within the purview of the Community.").
20081	 Made in America for European Tax: The Internal Consistency Test 	 1287
that disparities do not violate the nondiscrimination principle. 56 The
concept of disparities is explored more fully in Subpart C of this Part, 57
but, at the outset of the discussion, it is useful to emphasize that rather
than condemning all cross-border tax disadvantages, the ECJ focuses
instead on cases in which the member state targets cross-border activity
for harsher tax treatment than similar domestic activities." A conven-
ient way to think about the tax nondiscrimination principle in the
European Union is that it demands horizontal equity in the cross-
border context, but says nothing about vertical equity." Member states
make autonomous vertical equity judgments about tax rates, degrees of
progressivity, personal exemptions, and so on," but, once such judg-
ments are made, member states may be required to apply them with
equal force to both internal and cross-border situations."
B. Distinguishing Overlapping Taxation from Double Taxation
In order to understand the difficulties overlapping taxation creates
for the Court, one first needs to understand what overlapping taxation
is and how it differs from the more commonly understood concept of
"double taxation." For purposes of this Article, the term "overlapping
taxation" describes situations in which two or more states concurrently
exercise jurisdiction to tax a single item of income. For example, sup-
pose Smith resides in the United Kingdom and works in the Nether-
lands. For tax purposes, the United Kingdom is Smith's residence state,
50
	 e.g., Schempp, 2005 E.C.R. 1-6421, 1 34 (noting that the EC Treaty prohibition on
discrimination '`is not concerned with any disparities in treatment ... which may result
from divergences existing between the various member states, so long as they affect all
persons subject to them in accordance with objective criteria and without regard to their
nationality"); Case C-336/96, Gilly v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux du Sas-Rhin, 1998
E.C.R. I-2793,11 49, 53 (holding that a tax "disparity" resulting from differences between
the nondiscriminatory tax laws of two member states did not violate the EC Treaty).
si See infra notes 74-116 and accompanying text.
59 See infra notes 74-116 and accompanying text.
59 See, e.g., Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. 1-225, 11 24, 30. Horizontal equity is the notion that
similarly situated taxpayers should be treated the same. See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NA-
GEL, THE MY111 OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 37-39 (2002). Vertical equity refers to
the notion that there may be reasons to treat taxpayers at different income levels differ-
ently—for example, a state may conclude that higher income taxpayers should pay more
tax as a proportion of their income than do lower income taxpayers. See id. at 13.
ea See Gilly, 1998 E.C.R. 1-2793, 11 49, 53 (holding that a cross-border disadvantage due
to differences in national tax rates was not discriminatory).
el The ECJ often articulates the nondiscrimination standard as one that requires simi-
lar treatment for similar taxpayers. See, e.g., Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. 1-225, 11 24, 30. For
horizontal and vertical equity considerations in tax policy, see MURPHY & NAGEL, supra
note 59, at 12-39.
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and the Netherlands the source of her income. 62 As her residence state,
the United Kingdom asserts an unlimited right to tax Smith's income
wherever derived. The broad tax claim of states acting in a residence
capacity derives from protections and privileges they extend to their
residents at home and abroad, as well as any benefits provided, includ-
ing education, that enhance residents' ability to earn income abroad.°
The Netherlands, as the source state, also claims a right to tax Smith
because it provided conditions that enabled her to earn income within
its borders, including natural resources, infrastructure, labor and capi-
tal markets, and so on. 64 The source state's jurisdiction to tax is limited
to income earned within its territory. 65
Because both the residence and source states have the right to tax,
overlapping taxation is commonplace in cross-border situations. To
prevent cross-border taxpayers from suffering "juridical double taxa-
tion,"66 most residence states relieve double taxation unilaterally. Addi-
tionally, states may undertake reciprocal double tax relief obligations in
bilateral tax treaties.
In some cases, the tax treaty between the source state and the
residence state solves the overlapping tax problem by assigning exclu-
sive tax rights to one state. 67 Tax treaties, however, usually do not as-
sign exclusive taxing rights.° Instead, in most cases, they provide that
both states will exercise limited, but nevertheless concurrent, tax ju-
62 Residence for tax purposes is based on a personal connection to the state, such as
domicile or length of physical presence. See Hucti J, & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE
INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 347 (2d ed. 2004). The United States is unique
in taxing on the basis of citizenship, even when its citizens physically reside outside of the
United States. See id. Corporate tax residence is usually based on place of incorporation or
place of management and control. See id. at 347-50. For discussion of the normative justifica-
tions for source- and residence-based taxation, see generally Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and
the Taxation of International Income; 29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 145 (1998).
63 See Musgrave, supra note 16, at 1336-37; see also Michael J. Graetz & Michael M.
O'Hear, The "Original Intent" of U.S. International Taxation, 46 DUEL 14. 1021,1033-41 (1997).
" See Musgrave, supra note 16, at 1341-42.
65 See id.
66
 This Article uses the terms "juridical double taxation" or "double taxation" to refer
to "international juridical double taxation," which the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development ("OECD") defines as "the imposition of comparable taxes in
two (or more) States on the same taxpayer in respect of the same subject matter and for
identical periods." OECD, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND CAPITAL I I, at 7,
(7th ed., condensed version 2008) [hereinafter OECD MODEL].
67 See, e.g., id. art. 7(1), at 26. Under article 7 of the OECD Model Treaty, if an enter-
prise residing in one state (the residence state) has activities in the other state (the source
state), the source state may not tax the profits from those activities, unless the enterprise
has sufficient activities in the source state to constitute a "permanent establishment." See id.
69 See, e.g., id. art. 10, at 28-29.
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risdiction.69 In effect, the states share the tax revenue generated by
the cross-border income, with each state taxing the income less than it
would in a purely domestic situation."
Thus, although the two concepts are easily conflated, overlapping
jurisdiction to tax is not the same as unrelieved double taxation." Al-
though overlapping tax jurisdiction creates the risk of unrelieved dou-
ble taxation, it does not inevitably result in such double taxation. The
net result of overlapping taxation could be higher, lower, or the same.
amount of tax as would be paid in a purely domestic situation." Even
where double taxation (i.e., higher taxation) has been successfully
eliminated unilaterally or through bilateral tax treaties, overlapping
taxation usually persists, and, to the extent that the existence of over-
lapping taxation creates difficulties for the ECG in resolving tax cases,
those difficulties also persist."
69 For example, under article 10 of the OECD Model Treaty, the source state must
limit its taxation of portfolio dividends to fifteen percent of the gross amount of the divi-
dend paid by a company residing in its territory to a taxpayer resident in the other party to
the tax treaty. Id. But the residence state may also tax the same dividend. Id. art. 10(2) (b).
Although article 23 provides that the residence state will relieve any resulting double taxa-
tion, concurrent exercise of tax jurisdiction persists despite the presence of the treaty and
despite the obligation to relieve double taxation. Id. arts. 10,23, at 28-29,35-36.
79 See Warren, supra note 1, at 132 (describing the traditional division of the tax base
between the source and residence states as "a principal function, perhaps the principal
function, of the international income tax system" (citation omitted)).
71 Among tax lawyers, the term "double taxation" is almost synonymous with higher
taxation, and it constitutes such a clear source of impediments to cross-border economic
activity that, as early as 1899, Prussia and Austria entered into the first tax treaty to prevent
it. See ZVI DANIEL ALTMAN, DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER TAX TREATIES 13 (2005). The 200
pages of commentary to the OECD Model Treaty begin with the following statement of
purpose:
[Double taxation's] harmful effects on the exchange of goods and services
and movements of capital, technology, and persons are so well known that it
is scarcely necessary to stress the importance of removing obstacles that dou-
ble taxation presents to the development of economic relations between
countries.
OECD, Introduction to the OECD Model Tax Convention and Commentaryll (2005), reprinted
in 1 MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL AND EC TAX LAW 45 (Kees van Raad ed., fith ed. 2006).
In contrast, I use the term "overlapping taxation" to describe a common cross•border
situation in which two countries tax the same item of income.
72 Lower taxation would result if one state did not exercise its full taxing jurisdiction
because it anticipated that the other would do so, but the other slate did not fully tax.
Lower taxation could also result if one state perceived itself to have a double tax relief
obligation, even though the other state had not fully taxed the item of income.
75 See infra note 81-132 and accompanying text.
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C. Tax Disparities
The next fundamental issue concerns the nature of the difficulties
created for the ECJ by overlapping tax jurisdiction. According to the
Court, the member states remain free to set their own tax rates, tax
bases, and rules for allocating among themselves jurisdiction to tax in-
ternational income. 74 These retained powers enable the states to for-
mulate tax policy independently of each other and to meet their indi-
vidual revenue needs. The simultaneous application of uncoordinated
tax laws by two states, however, may result in tax disparities, which the
Court defines as differences between the tax treatment of cross-border
and domestic situations that arise from unharmonized member state
tax systems."
In recognition of member state tax autonomy, the ECJ acknowl-
edges that disparities do not violate the prohibition on discriminatory
taxation," and the Court has declared that the EC Treaty provides no
guarantee to EU taxpayers that their decision to engage in cross-
border economic activities will be tax neutral. 77 Nevertheless, when a
tax disparity results in a net tax disadvantage to the taxpayer, the
Court may erroneously conclude that there was discrimination." Ad-
ditionally, when a tax disparity results in a net tax advantage, the ad-
vantage may obscure the fact that one of the states actually discrimi-
nated in violation of the EC Treaty."
74 See, e.g., Franked Investment Income, 2006 E.C.R. 1-11753, 1 52 ("[I]n the absence of
any unifying or harmonizing Community measures, member states retain the power to
define, by treaty or unilaterally, the criteria for allocating their powers of taxation, particu-
larly with a view to eliminating double taxation.").
75 See, e.g., Schempp, 2005 E.C.R. 1.6421, 1 34 ("It is settled case-law that Article 12 EC is
not concerned with any disparities in treatment, for persons and undertakings subject to
the jurisdiction of the Community, which may result from divergences existing between
the various Member States, so long as they affect all persons subject to them in accordance
with objective criteria and without regard to their nationality." (citation omitted)).
76 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. It is possible that disparities between mem-
ber states' laws, although nondiscriminatory, could so hamper cross-border movements
that the Court would consider them to violate the EC Treaty as "restrictions." See infra
notes 199-210 and accompanying text (considering how adoption by the ECJ of a "restric-
tion" approach in tax cases would impact the proposal made in this Article).
" Cf Case C-365/02, In re Lindfors, 2004 E.C.R. 1-7183, 1 34 ("rhe EC Treaty offers no
guarantee to a citizen of the Union that transferring his activities to a Member State other
than that in which he previously resided will be neutral as regards taxation. Given the dis-
parities in the tax legislation of the Member States, such a transfer may be to the citizen's
advantage in terms of indirect taxation or not, according to circumstance.").
78 See infra notes 80-98 and accompanying text.
79 See infra notes 99-116 and accompanying text.
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1. When Higher Taxes Do Not Discriminate
A higher tax bill alone is not proof of discrimination. 8° The EC
Treaty only protects EU nationals from discriminatory taxes—those
that use the taxpayer's nationality, residence, or foreign-source in-
come as a basis for less favorable taxation compared to that applied in
a similar domestic situation. Disparities n -lay, however, create nondis-
criminatory cross-border tax disadvantages that the Court erroneously
perceives to be discriminatory.
Consideration of disparate tax rates shows why disparities do not
constitute nationality discrimination, even when they create cross-
border tax disadvantages. Suppose there are two member states: High
and Low. High taxes all income at a rate of 50%, while Low taxes all
income at a rate of 25%. If Mary resides in Low, but invests in High, she
will pay higher taxes on her cross-border investment than she would on
an equivalent domestic investment in Low. Mary therefore suffers a
cross-border tax disadvantage. High does not discriminate against her,
however, as long as it taxes her at the same rate as it would have taxed
one of its own residents. To preserve the member states' autonomy to
set tax rates, the Court has accepted cross-border tax disadvantages
caused by differences in tax rates. 8t In contrast, discrimination occurs
when a member state singles out cross-border taxpayers or cross-border
activities for worse tax treatment. 82 For example, High would discrimi-
nate if it taxed Mary at a rate of 60% while taxing its own residents at
only 50%.85
80 See, e.g., Gilly, 1998 E.C.R. 1-2793, 11 34, 48; cf. In re Lindfors, 2004 E.C.R. 1-7183,
1 34.
81 See Gilly, 1998 E.C.R. 1-2793, 11 34, 48 (holding that a cross-border tax disadvantage
caused by the resident state's foreign tax credit limitation did not violate the EC Treaty
because the disadvantage was caused by divergent "scales of direct taxation" and to require
the resident state to 'reduce its tax in respect of the remaining income ... would • en-
croach on its sovereignty in matters of direct taxation").
Advocate General Leger noted that the ECJ lacks the power to eliminate disparities:
"[I]n the absence of Community harmonisation it must be accepted that there is competi-
tion between the tax regimes of the various Member States." Case C-196/04, Cadbury
Schweppes plc v. Comm'rs of Inland Revenue, 2006 E.C.R. 1-7995,155 (opinion of Advo-
cate General Leger); see also Case G374/04, Test Claimants v. Comm'rs of Inland Revenue,
2006 E.C.R. I-11673,11 37-39 (opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed) (concluding that
disparity cases are nonjusticiable).
82 Nationality and state of tax residence tend to .overlap; therefore, the Court scruti-
nizes tax classifications based on residence because such classifications may indirectly dis-
criminate on the basis of nationality. See, e.g., Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. 1-225,11 27-29.
ss See Royal Bank of Scot., 1997 E.C.R. 1-2651, I 34 (holding that Greece discriminated
when it taxed domestic banks at 35% but branches of foreign banks at 90%).
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Like tax rates, tax base definitions vary considerably from state to
state." These differences derive from divergent tax policy decisions by
the member states. Consider the taxation of alimony. Some states tax
alimony as income to the recipient. To ensure that alimony income
will be taxed at least once, but not more than once, between the for-
mer spouses, such states allow the alimony payer to deduct it. But the
same result—a single tax on the alimony—could be achieved by in-
cluding the alimony in the payer's income (by denying the deduc-
tion), and excluding the alimony from the income of the recipient.
The first method makes the recipient taxable on the alimony, while
the second method makes the payer taxable. The choice between the
two is a matter of national tax policy.
Germany employs the first method, but Austria employs the sec-
ond.85 The disparity in the treatment of alimony between Germany
and Austria could lead to a cross-border disadvantage if the alimony
payer lives in Austria, and the recipient in Germany. In that case, both
the payer and the recipient may be taxed on the alimony. 86 Although
this result would be harsh, neither state would have committed na-
tionality discrimination because neither state singled out cross-border
alimony payments for worse tax treatment than that applicable to
domestic alimony payments. Instead, the cross-border tax disadvan-
tage resulted from the mismatch of the German and Austrian tax sys-
tems; it is a disparity. 87
Notice that differences in national tax rules may also result in
cross-border tax advantages. When Mary, who resides in Low, invests in
High, she suffers a cross-border tax disadvantage. A resident of High
who invests in Low, however, would secure a cross-border tax advantage
from the differences in national tax rates. Similarly; although an Aus-
trian alimony payer and a German alimony recipient both may pay tax
on the same cross-border alimony payment, if the payer lives in Ger-
many and the recipient in Austria, neither may pay tax on the ali-
mony. 88 The first case might seem too harsh and the second case too
84 See, e.g., Schtmpp, 2005 E.C.R. 1-6421,11 42-48.
85 See id. (involving cross-border alimony payments from Germany to Austria). The
United States taxes the recipient on alimony, and it allows the payer a deduction. See I.R.C.
.§§ 61, 71 (2000).
88 See Schempp, 2005 E.C.R. 1-6421.
87 See id.
88 The payer would get a deduction in Germany, but the Austrian recipient would not
have to include the alimony in income. Cf. id. 1 5. This example assumes that the payer's
deduction would not be conditioned upon the recipient's inclusion of the payment in
income. This assumption is contrary to fact in the case of Germany. See id.; cf. Lunding v.
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generous, but the unfairness stems from the mismatch of the German
and Austrian tax systems, not discrimination.° These features are
common to all tax disparities: (1) they may create disadvantages or ad-
vantages for cross-border situations, and (2) no particular state can be
said to be at fault for the disadvantage or advantage.
Because it can be difficult to distinguish cross-border tax disadvan-
tages caused by disparities from cross-border tax disadvantages caused
by discrimination, however, the ECJ may incorrectly hold merely dispa-
rate tax laws to be discriminatory." Such judicial errors infringe mem-
ber state tax autonomy, unnecessarily narrow member states' tax policy
options, and make it more difficult for member states to raise sufficient
tax revenue to fund their social programs. 91 To the extent that member
state tax laws represent the political will of the state's population, the
Court's erroneous invalidation of tax laws also exacerbates the anti-
majoritarian difficulty.92 Thus, the ECJ is sometimes perceived as sup-
planting the role of national legislatures in making tax policy although
it lacks both a democratic mandate and tax expertise.93
On the other hand, judicial overreaching in the tax area promotes
tax harmonization, which could lower compliance costs, reduce distor-
dons of decisions by EU taxpayers concerning where to locate eco-
N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 314-15 (1998) (involving an alimony deduction
allowed by the state of New lOrk to resident payers without a requirement that an out-of-
state recipient be subject to tax on the alimony).
es It is possible that disparities between member states' laws, although nondiscrimina-
tory, could so hamper cross-border movements that the Court would consider them to
violate the EC Treaty as "restrictions." See infra notes 199-210 and accompanying text.
9° Arguably, this was the case in De Groot. See Case C.-385/00, De Groot v. Staatssecre-
taris van Financien, 2002 E.C.R. 1-11819, HO (holding that a member state discriminated
against a resident taxpayer when it denied personal tax relief in proportion to the resi-
dent's exempt foreign-source income). The Court based its holding in part on reliance on
the fact that the host states in which the taxpayer earned his foreign income would not
provide the taxpayer with personal tax relief, even though they taxed him on his income
sourced within their territory. See id.; see also Wattel, supra note 14, at 213.
91 This effect may be exacerbated by the ECis consistent refusal to recognize the need
to raise revenue or to prevent tax base erosion as proper justifications for tax discrimina-
tion. See, e.g., Case C-422/01, FOrs5kringsaktiebolaget Skandia (Publ.) v. Riksskatteverket,
2003 E.C.R. 1-6817, 1 53 ("[T]he need to prevent the reduction of tax revenue is not ...
matter of overriding general interest ... which would justify a restriction „ . ."): De Groot,
2002 E.C.R. 1-11819, 1 103 ("(A1 loss of tax revenue can never be relied upon to justify a
restriction on the exercise of a fundamental freedom." (citation omitted)).
ge Mason, supra note 14, at 95-103 (arguing that national tax systems give voice to the
particular cultural and political values of the citizens of each member state and provide a
competitive regulatory market through which the best tax system has a chance to emerge).
93 See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Dividend Taxation in Europe: When
the ECJ Makes Tax Policy, 44 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1577, 1602-03 (2007) [hereinafter
Graetz & Warren, Dividend Taxation in Europe]; Graetz & Warren, supra note 14, at 1229-32.
1294	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 49:1277
nornic activity and investment, and reduce the risk of unrelieved dou-
ble taxation. In addition, greater tax harmonization could counteract
what some have characterized as a "race to the bottom" in which mem-
ber states compete for investment by lowering their taxes." Such com-
petition could ultimately result in reduced social spending, as states cut
benefits to keep pace with lesser tax revenues."
Despite these potential benefits, greater tax harmonization in
Europe is not necessarily desirable. 96 State tax autonomy allows states to
respond quickly and flexibly to voter preferences, and the presence of
competing tax jurisdictions imposes budgetary discipline on each
state.97 Moreover, further judicial encroachments on member state tax
sovereignty could provoke backlash among the member states. If the
states perceive the Court to exceed its mandate to review national tax
laws for discrimination, they could narrow its jurisdiction. The mem-
ber states have already considered revoking the Court's jurisdiction to
review national direct tax cases." Although this radical idea may have
been motivated primarily by the desire to shield even discriminatory
tax legislation from judicial review, the Court's invalidation of merely
disparate tax legislation may ultimately undermine its position as the
primary force for tax integration in the European Union.
Disparities, and the market distortions they create, can thus be
seen as the price paid for retained member state tax sovereignty. And to
avoid infringing member state tax sovereignty; the EC] needs a reliable
way to determine when cross-border tax disadvantages result from
disparities.
94 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: A
Package to Combat Harmful Tax Competition in the European Union, at 3-4, COM (1997) 564
final (May 11, 1997) (discussing tax competition among the EU member states).
See id. But see Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Competition and the European Union: Contrasting
Perspectives, 31 REGIONAL SC'. & URB. EcoN. 133, 137 (2001) (characterizing the studies on
inter-jurisdictional tax competition as finding that such competition results in suboptimal
equilibria, rather than a grace to the bOttom" or a "downward spiral in public sector activi-
ties").
" See Mason, supra note 14, at 100 (describing tax competition as an important com-
ponent of Ireland's recent economic growth). See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Business In-
centives, Interstate Competition, and the Commerce Clause, 82 MINN. L. REV. 447 (1997) (arguing
more generally that regulatory competition between the states may be constructive).
97 See, e.g, Oates, supra note 95, at 135-36, 143.
" See Melchior Wathelet, Direct Taxation and EU Law: Integration or Disintegration?, 13 EC
TAX REV. 2, 4 (2004) (criticizing such suggestions made at the Intergovernmental Confer-
ence for the European Constitution).
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2. When Lower Taxes Discriminate
Although the ECJ and commentators usually conceive of dispari-
ties as creating net cross-border disadvantages, as the tax rate and ali-
mony examples show, differences between the tax systems of the mem-
ber states may also result in net cross-border advantages. A net cross-
border tax advantage does not by itself create a discrimination prob-
lem, but favorable tax treatment by one state could obscure discrimina-
tion by another. This is because a tax benefit available in one member
state may compensate for tax discrimination imposed by the other tax-
ing state, such that the overall tax paid is the same (or lower) than the
tax that would be collected in a purely domestic situation. Failure by
the Court to find violations in such cases undermines tax competition.
It also tends to shift tax revenue from EC law-compliant states to dis-
criminating states because the state offering the compensating tax ad-
vantage forgoes revenue to maintain a neutral (or advantageous) tax
situation for the cross-border taxpayer.
An example will illustrate the point. A source state may grant tax
credits on outbound income, such that, even after the residence state
imposes discriminatory taxes, the taxpayer suffers no net tax disadvan-
tage, or even comes out ahead as compared with a purely domestic
transaction. Arguably, this occurred in the controversial case Ke► ckhaert
& Morres v. Belgium, decided by the ECJ in 2006. 99 That case involved
dividends paid by a company resident in France to individuals resident
in Belgium.m In order to eliminate economic double taxation of cor-
porate profits, 101 France operated a shareholder imputation system un-
der which shareholders received credit for the taxes paid by the corpo-
ration. 02 These credits either reduced the French tax due from the
94 Case C-513/04, 2006 E.C.R. 1-10967.
See id. 11 1-12.
1 ° 1 Economic double taxation occurs when the same item of income is taxed to each of
two different taxpayers. For example, corporate profits are taxed first to the company
when earned, and again to the shareholder when distributed as dividends. Countries seek-
ing to relieve economic double taxation of corporate profits employ a variety of relief
mechanisms. See generally DEPT OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND
CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE (1992); ALVIN C. 'WARREN, JR.,
INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAXES: REPORTER'S STUDY OF
CORPORATE TAX INTEGRATION (1993) (both studies evaluated reason's for integration and
methods to achieve it). Until a recent series of judgments by the ECJ made it untenable,
many of the EU member states relieved economic double taxation via shareholder imputa-
tion. See Graetz & Warren, Dividend Taxation in Europe, supra note 93, at 1591; Walter Hel-
lerstein et al., Constitutional Constraints on Dividend Taxation, 61 "Dot L. REV. (forthcoming
2008) (manuscript at 38).
102 Kerckhaert & Monts, 2006 E.C.R. 1-10967,11 2-8.
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shareholder on the corporation's dividends or were refundable. 1 °3 Un-
der the French system, both foreign and domestic shareholders were
entitled to imputation credits.'"
When a French company paid dividends to Kerckhaert and Morres
in Belgium, Belgium taxed them at the rate that applied to domestic
dividends, without crediting the taxes already assessed against the divi-
dends by France. 145 Kerckhaert and Morres argued that Belgium's fail-
ure to credit the French tax was discriminatory because it meant that
foreign dividends were subject to double taxation, while domestic divi-
dends were not. 106 Due to the French imputation credit, however,
Kerckhaert and Morres actually got to keep a larger proportion of the
pre-tax profit on their French dividends than they would have kept on
domestic dividends.'" The Advocate General in the case concluded
that in the absence of a net cross-border tax disadvantage compared to
an equivalent domestic investment, there could be no discrimina-
tion. 108 Although the Court did not expressly rely on the Advocate
General's reasoning to decide the case, the absence of a net tax disad-
vantage in Kerckhaert Moues made it difficult to perceive that by fail-
os Id.
1" Id.
tos Id.11 9-12.
100 1d. 1 13.
107 Kerckhaert	 Morns, 2006 E.C.R. 1-10967, ¶1 26-27 (opinion of Advocate General
Geelhoed). Advocate General Geelhoed compared the taxation of a $1,000 French divi-
dend entitled to French imputation credits with a $1,000 Belgian dividend as follows:
French Dividend Belgian Dividend
a. Dividend	 1000	 1000
b. French imputation credit (50%)	 500	 n/t
c. Gross Distribution	 1500	 1000
d. Foreign withholding tax (15%)	 (2251
e. Net distribution (subject to shareholder	 1275	 1000
tax in Belgium)
f. Belgian shareholder tax (25%)	 (319)	 (250)
g. Belgian credit for French withholding tax	 0
h. Net after-tax distribution	 956	 750
Id. 1 25.
Belgium's failure to credit French withholding taxes (line g) raised concerns that it
discriminated against foreign dividends, but the Advocate General concluded that since
Kerckhaert and Morres retained more after-tax income from their $1,000 French dividend
than they would have retained on a $1,000 Belgian dividend (line h), they could not have
suffered discrimination. See id. 1 25-27.
108 Id. 1 27 NT] he actual (favourable) effect of the legislative framework for Mr. and
Mrs. Kerckhaert-Morres is in my view decisive on the facts of the present case ....").
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ing to credit foreign dividend taxation, but nevertheless assessing the
full measure of domestic tax against inbound dividends, Belgium may
have violated the EC Treaty by systematically subjecting dividends from
foreign companies to greater overall tax than domestic dividends.'"
If the purpose of the tax nondiscrimination principle is to pro-
mote intra-Community investment by removing obstacles to cross-
border investments, then, to the extent that a taxpayer will not actually
suffer a net diSadvantage because of discriminatory member state taxa-
tion, one could argue that there is no reason to prohibit k 11° One
might thus argue that compensatory taxation in the other member
state ought to be relevant to the determination of whether a particular
member state violated the EC Treaty. But requiring a net cross-border
tax disadvantage would unnecessarily narrow the concept of tax dis-
crimination. When one state compensates for the tax discrimination of
another, the compensating state bears the economic burden of the dis-
criminatory tax. Tax advantages granted by source states to foreigners,
109
	
argument that Belgium discriminated was based on its failure to credit foreign
withholding taxes. Id. 1 14. If, rather than coming from France, the dividend had been
sourced in another EU member state that did not grant shareholder imputation credits to
foreign shareholders, a $1,000 gross dividend would have been taxable as follows:
French
Dividend
Belgian
Dividend
Other Member
State Dividend
a. Dividend 1000 1000 1000
b. Imputation credit (50% in France) 500 Atil 0
c. Gross distribution 1500 1000 1000
d. Foreign withholding tax (15%) (225) t_iLt (150)
e. Net distribution (subject to shareholder
tax in Belgium)
1275 1000 850
1.	 Belgian shareholder tax (25%) (319) (250) (212)
B. Belgian credit for foreign withholding tax 0 ttZa 0
h. Net after-tax distribution 956 750 638
Thus, in the absence of source-state imputation credits, it becomes apparent that divi-
dends sourced in other member states were subject to greater taxation than Belgian divi-
dends (line h). For the argument that French shareholder imputation credits masked tax
discrimination by Belgium in Karkhaert & Moms by putting Belgian shareholders of French
companies in a better after-tax position than Belgian shareholders of Belgian companies, see
Georg W Railer & Ruth Mason, Double Taxation: A EurVean -Switch in Time?", 14 Ormond. J.
Eux. L. 63, 79-81 (2007).
no This was the view of ECJ Advocate General Geelhoed. See Kerekhaert & Manes, 2006
E.C.R. 1-10967, 11 26-27 (opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed). Advocate General
Peter Wattel of the Dutch Supreme Court appears to hold similar views. See Weber, supra
note 14, at 603-07 (criticizing Wattel's view that discrimination by the source state does
not violate EC law as long as the taxpayer pays no more tax overall after taking into con-
sideration the residence state's credit system).
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including the French shareholder imputation credit, are not free. To
offer such tax advantages, the source state forgoes tax revenue or
makes direct payments to the taxpayer. Allowing discriminatory taxes in
the residence state to neutralize tax advantages offered by the source
state would undermine the source state's ability to compete for foreign
investment. 111
The ECJ has acknowledged that one of the consequences of creat-
ing the common market was tax competition among the member
states, and, more generally, that creating a robust regulatory market-
place was an explicit aim of the common market.'" In 1999, in
Eurowings Luftverkehrs AG v. Finanzamt Dortmund-Unna, the ECJ held that
Germany could not assess higher taxes on German businesses leasing
from Irish companies in order to compensate for the fact that Irish
companies were subject to lower taxation at home. 113 The ECJ noted
that, "[a] s the Commission rightly observed, such compensatory tax
arrangements prejudice the very foundations of the single market."'"
Thus, contrary to the arguments of some commentators, permitting tax
discrimination when it does not result in a net tax disadvantage for the
taxpayer may affect the common market by undermining tax competi-
tion.
Moreover, when one state compensates for the tax discrimination
of another, the result is to shift tax revenue from an EC law-compliant
state to a discriminating state. The potential for revenue shifting can be
demonstrated with a simple example. The United Kingdom taxes its
residents' worldwide income, but, against the British tax due on foreign
source income, the United Kingdom allows its residents credits for
taxes paid to the source state.'" Suppose that the Netherlands assessed
a discriminatory $10 tax against Smith, a U.K. resident, whereas the
111 The EC prohibition on state aids limits the member states' ability to grant tax in-
centives to encourage inbound investment. See EC Treaty art. 87 ("[A)id granted by a
Member State .. • in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competi-
tion „ . shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the
common market ...."). Certain enticements, however, such as uniformly low rate rates,
are permissible.
112 See, e.g., Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v.
Inspire Art Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. 1-10155, ¶1 137-38, 143; Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erh-
vervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459, 1 26-27.
" 3 See Case C-294/97, 1999 E.C.R. 1-7447,1 29. The Court rejected as a justification for
higher taxation Germany's argument that the 'lessor established in another Member State
might be able to charge the lessee a lower rental because he is not liable to trade tax." Id.
" 4 Id. 1 45.
113 See Avery Jones, supra note 14, at 3 (describing how the resident state's foreign tax
regime could compensate for discrimination by the source state).
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nondiscriminatory tax would have been $6. Suppose further that the
U.K. tax on the same income was $11. If the United Kingdom fully
credits the discriminatory Dutch tax, Smith will suffer no overall tax
disadvantage. She will pay $11 in taxes overall, consisting of $10 paid to
the Netherlands and $1 paid to the United Kingdom (the U.K. tax due
is $11 less the $10 credit for Dutch taxes paid). Although Smith's over-
all tax liability would be unaffected by the Netherlands' discrimination,
the discrimination shifts revenue from the United Kingdom to the
Netherlands. In this example, the United Kingdom collected only $1 of
tax, instead of the $5 it would have collected had the Netherlands not
discriminated. Thus, discrimination by the source state may make
maintenance of capital export neutrality more expensive for the resi-
dence state.
In addition to undermining tax competition and shifting tax
revenue from EGlaw compliant states to discriminatory states, when
the ECJ fails to recognize discriminatory taxes because they are ob-
scured by advantages offered by other member states, the ECJ narrows
the rights of EU nationals and allows the states to maintain distortive
taxes that reduce social welfare." 6 The EC Treaty's prohibition of na-
tionality discrimination will only reinforce economic and political un-
ion to the extent that the Court recognizes and censures discrimina-
tion. Thus, it is crucial that the ECJ adopt a method of analyzing tax
cases that will bring even obscure tax discrimination to light.
D. A Methodology, Not a Standard of Review
Advocate General Geelhoed observed that the key feature distin-
guishing disparity from discrimination is that discrimination 'occurs as
the result of the rules of just one tax jurisdiction," whereas disparity
results from the interaction of the laws of two states."' Although this
observation is helpful, the exercise of tax jurisdiction by at least two
states in almost all cross-border tax cases makes it difficult for the Court
to determine when tax disadvantages arise from just one state's law and
116 ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN
EUROPE 96 (2000). Stone Sweet notes that although the ECJ has elaborated "a charter of
rights for the Community," the original purpose of the fundamental freedoms "was not so
much to create rights claims for individuals, as to remove potential distortions within an
emerging common market." Id. at 170-71.
117 See Test Claimants v. Commis of Inland Revenue, 2006 E.C.R. 1-11673,1 46 (opinion of
Advocate General Geelhoed); set also Weber, supra note 14, at 588.
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when they arise from the interaction of two states' laws.' 18
 If the ECJ
were simply to invalidate all cross-border tax disadvantages, without re-
gard to whether they stemmed from discrimination or disparity, the
Court would invade the reserved tax competence of the member states
to independently determine their tax laws. To avoid this, the Court
needs a reliable method to distinguish between cross-border tax disad-
vantages caused by discrimination and those caused by disparities.
Before discussing the methods currently in use by the Court to
analyze tax discrimination cases involving overlapping taxation and be-
fore introducing a proposal for a new approach, it is worth noting that
this Article proposes a method of analysis, not a standard of review. 19
The Court could employ the internal consistency test to help it under-
stand the tax situation in the defendant member state, but the method
does not, by itself, provide criteria for deciding cases. After applying the
harmony constraint, the Court would still have to apply its pre-existing
tax discrimination standard to any remaining tax disadvantages to de-
termine whether they violate EC law. The problem identified and ad-
dressed here is that no matter what standard the Court uses to evaluate
member state tax laws, overlapping taxation as a structural feature of
international taxation tends to obscure the presence of discrimination
in some cases and to suggest its presence where there is none in other
cases.
Thus, arguments that the Court should strike a different balance
in reviewing national tax laws in order to afford member states greater
tax autonomy, or in the alternative, to offer greater protection to EU
taxpayers, although important, are not relevant here. 12° Instead, this
Article takes the Court's discrimination standard as a given and offers a
method of analysis that should allow the Court to more easily and accu-
rately apply that standard to tax cases."'
II. CURRENT APPROACHES TO ANALYZING TAX DISCRIMINATION
Without explicitly conceiving of overlapping taxation as creating
both positive and negative disparities that obscure discrimination in the
ways described above, both the ECJ and commentators have been
aware that taxation by more than one state poses difficulties in evaluat-
119
 It is also possible for both countries to discriminate in the taxation of cross-border
income.
119 For further discussion, see infra notes 199-210 and accompanying text.
12°
 For articles concerning the Court's discrimination standards, see references in note
14, supra.
121 See infra notes 162-198 and accompanying text.
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ing tax cases. 1 R2 This difficulty is most noticeable when the Court tries
to limit the scope of its inquiry in a tax case. The Court has struggled
with the question of whether the tax rules of the residence state are
relevant to the determination of whether the source state discriminated
and vice versa."' For example, if Smith, the U.K. tax resident working
in the Netherlands, sues the Netherlands for violating her fundamental
freedoms by denying her a tax benefit available to Dutch residents, to
what extent should the ECJ take into consideration tax benefits avail-
able under British law that reduce or eliminate the harm of the Dutch
tax rule? Should positive disparities be considered to mitigate the harm
of tax discrimination? If Smith pays higher taxes on her cross-border
income than she would on purely domestic income, how can the Court
determine whether the disadvantage constitutes discrimination (caused
by British law alone or Dutch law alone) or a negative disparity (caused
by the interaction of nondiscriminatory British and Dutch laws)?
The ECJ has taken two different and incompatible approaches to
overlapping tax situations, which commentators have named the "per-
country approach" and the "overall approach. "124 Under the per-
country approach, the Court considers the laws of the defendant state
in isolation."5 In contrast, under the overall approach, the Court con-
siders both the laws of the defendant member state and the other tax-
ing state, giving it an "overall" view of the tax situation, including both
source and residence taxation. 126 This Part describes the two method-
ologies and explains why each inadequately addresses problems cre-
ated by overlapping taxation.
A. The Methods
As a defense against accusations of tax discrimination, member
states often argue that disadvantages imposed on nonresidents under
122 See infra notes 123-161 and accompanying text.
125 See Case C-374/04, Test Claimants v. Comm'rs of Inland Revenue, 2006 E.C.R. I.
11673, 1 95 (opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed); Weber, supra note 14, at 599.
12.1 Se4 e.g., Weber, supra note 14, at 599; see also Test Claimants u Comm'rs of Inland Reve-
nue, 2006 E.C.R. 1-11673, 1 95 (opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed). Note that 'per-
country" and "overall" are simply names given by commentators and advoattes general to
these perspectives, though the judgments of the ECJ do not contain explicit references to
these approaches, and indeed, the Court's decisions do not acknowledge that the Court has
Liken different approaches in different cases. Compare Case C-294/97, Eurowings
Luftverkehrs AG v. Finanzamt Dortmund-Unna, 1999 E.C.R. 1-7447, 11 43-44, with Case C-
319/02, In re Manninen, 2004 E.C.R. 1-7477, 1 54.
125 See, e.g., Eurowings, 1999 E.C.R. 1-7447, 11 43-44.
126 see, e.g., Manninen, 2004 E.C.R. 1-7477,1 54.
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their tax laws are compensated by advantages available in the taxpayer's
home state. For example, in Eurowings Lujiverkehrs AG v. Finanzamt
Dortmund-Unna, decided by the ECJ in 1999, Germany imposed higher
trade taxes on German companies that leased equipment from foreign
companies than it imposed on German companies that leased equip-
ment from other German companies. 127 The German referring court
asked the ECJ whether the absence of trade taxes in Ireland and low
Irish corporate tax rates were relevant to determining whether the
German rule violated an Irish lessor's freedom to provide services in
Germany. 128 In the view of the German government, because the Irish
lessor was not subject to trade tax in Germany or in Ireland, it was not
similarly situated to a German lessor, and it therefore did not have to
be treated similarly to a German lessor. 129
The ECJ rejected Germany's argument and held that:
Any tax advantage resulting for providers of services from the
low taxation to which they are subject in the member state in
which they are established cannot be used by another mem-
ber state to justify less favourable treatment in tax matters
given to recipients of services established in the latter State.'"
Thus, a member state may not justify tax discrimination on the grounds
that the taxpayer is subject to lower taxation elsewhere in the Commu-
nity."' This result is consonant with the idea that a purpose of the EU
common market is to facilitate EU nationals' access to tax and regula-
tory advantages available in other member states.'"
'sr
	 1999 E.C.R. I.7447,'1 19. The method of discrimination in Eurowings was
indirect: rather than explicitly assessing higher trade taxes on leases from foreign compa-
nies, Germany granted a partial exemption from trade tax to companies renting equip-
ment from other companies also liable for trade tax. See id. 1 18. Since foreign companies
tended not to be liable for trade tax in Germany, the impact of the facially neutral law was
disparate. See id. 1 19.
128 Id. 1 21.
IN Id. 1 28. The Irish lessor paid no trade tax in Ireland and enjoyed "Shannon privi-
leges" in the form of a 10% corporate tax rate. Id.1 21.
1 " Id. 11 43-44 (citing Case 270/83, Conun'n v. France, 1986 E.C.R. 273 & Case C-
107/94, Asscher v. Staatssecretaris van Financien, 1996 E.C.R. 1-3089, for the proposition
that that discrimination by the host state could not be compensated by unrelated tax ad-
vantages granted to the nonresident by the host state).
131 See id. The U.S. Supreme Court takes a similar approach when evaluating state tax
discrimination. See Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheirer, 483 U.S. 266, 288 (1987). The
Supreme Court stated that "the Commerce Clause does not permit compensatory meas-
ures for the disparities that result from each State's choice of tax levels." Id.
"2 See Case G212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-
1459, 1 27. The Court in Centros held that, except in cases of fraud, Denmark could not
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Although in Eurowings the Court adopted a per-country approach
under which it declared that the tax situation in the residence state
had no bearing on the question of whether the accused source state
discriminated, the Court has also taken the opposite approach in
some cases. Under the overall approach, the Court considers the
overall tax situation in both the defendant state and other taxing state
to determine whether the defendant state violated EC law. 133
For example, in In re Manninen, decided by the Eqj in 2004,
Finland granted resident shareholders of domestic companies imputa-
tion credits to relieve the burden of double taxation of corporate prof-
its, but it denied such credits to resident shareholders of foreign com-
panies.'" Manninen was a Finnish shareholder taxable in Finland on
dividends he received from a Swedish company, but he was denied Fin-
nish imputation credits. 135 He argued that Finland discriminated
against him when it denied him imputation credits on dividends from a
company established in another member state. 136 Finland defended its
rule by arguing that domestic corporate profit distributions were dis-
similar to inbound corporate profit distributions. 137 The dissimilarity
arose because Finland taxed inbound distributions only once, in the
hands of the shareholder, but it taxed domestic distributions twice—
once in the hands of the corporation when it earned the profits, and
again in the hands of the shareholder upon distribution. 138 Because
Finland subjected only domestic distributions to economic double taxa-
refuse to recognize the Danish secondary establishment of a company primarily estab-
lished in the United Kingdom, even if the U.K. establishment had no activities and ap-
peared to be established in the United Kingdom for the purpose of avoiding Danish cor-
porate capitalization rules, stating:
[T] he fact that a national of a Member State who wishes to set up a company
chooses to form it in the Member State whose rules of company law seem to
him the least restrictive and to set up branches in other member states can-
not, in itself, constitute an abuse of the right of establishment.
Id.; see also Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandei en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. In-
spire Art Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. 1-10155, 1 143 (holding that the ability to form a company in
one member state with the specific intent to establish a branch in a second state, while
taking advantage of favorable law in the first state, is an essential part of the freedom of
establishment) .
133 The Court has taken this approach in many of the recent controversial cross-border
dividend cases. See, e.g., Man ninen, 2004 E.C.R. 1-7477, I 54. For critical discussion of these
cases, see generally Graetz & Warren, Dividend Taxation in Europe, supra note 93.
134 For discussion of imputation credits, see supra notes 99-116 and accompanying text.
Manninen, 2004 E.C.R. 1-7477, ¶1 12-13.
'35 M. 1 14.
137 1'61.11 26-27.
138 Id. ¶1 27, 30.
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tion, and the imputation credit was designed to provide relief from
economic double taxation, Finland argued that it was appropriate to
limit imputation credits to domestic dividends. 139
Nevertheless, taking the overall situation into account, the Court
held that domestic and inbound dividends were similar because both
actually were subject to economic double taxation.'" In the case of
domestic dividends, Finland collected both the corporate- and share-
holder-level taxes, but in the case of dividends inbound from Sweden,
although Finland only collected the shareholder-level tax, the corpo-
rate-level tax had been collected from the Swedish corporation by Swe-
den."' Thus, taking into account the taxation by both the source state
(Sweden) and the residence state (Finland), domestic and inbound
dividends were both subject to double taxation, and Finland could not
tax them differently. 142
The ECJ came to a similar conclusion in 2005 with respect to cor-
porate tax losses in Marks es' Spencer plc v. Halsey." 5 In that case, the
ECJ applied the overall approach to conclude that where the state of
establishment of a subsidiary could not grant the subsidiary the tax
benefit of its losses, the state of establishment of its parent company
must allow those losses to offset the income of the parent company or
other companies in its corporate group. 144 In both Manninen and
Marks & Spencer, the tax obligations of one state were thus expressly
conditioned on the tax treatment by another state. 145
B. Criticism
One might argue that the Court should choose a method and
then stick with it. If, as the analysis of Eurowings and Manninen sug-
gests, the choice of method affects the outcome of the case, then fail-
ure to commit to a particular methodology introduces excessive legal
uncertainty into an area in which certainty is particularly important.
In order for the member states to make reliable budgetary predic-
tions, they need to be able to assess the risk that their tax laws will be
159 Id, 1 30.
145 Manninere, 2004 E.C.R. 1-7477, II 54-55.
t41 Id. ¶1 12-13.
142 Id. 11 54-55.
13 See C-446/03, Marks & Spencer plc v. Halsey, 2005 E.C.R. 1-10837, 159.
144 Id. I 55. The parent company's state must allow the losses of a foreign subsidiary
only if there is no possibility" that the foreign subsidiary will be able to take the losses in
its own state of establishment now or in the future. Id.
145 Id.1 59; Manninen, 2004 E.C.R. I-7477.154.
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held to violate EC law. Likewise; EU taxpayers contemplating cross-
border investments need to be able to estimate their tax exposure. If
the Court continues to apply inconsistent methods, even a member
state making good faith efforts to conform its tax system to EC law will
have trouble determining which laws require reform, and EU taxpay-
ers will not be able to reliably predict their entitlements under EC law.
Perhaps shifting between the per-country approach and the over-
all approach would be acceptable if each approach were more effec-
tive for certain kinds of cases. 14-6 But the Court has offered no expla-
nation for why it vacillates between the approaches, and, indeed, it
has never explicitly acknowledged that it has adopted different ap-
proaches in different cases. 147 Making matters worse, the Court does
not apply the overall approach in the same way every time. The Court
sometimes analyzes the actual law of the other member states in-
volved, but at other times it speculates about what the other state's law
might be and decides the case based on those assumptions.' 8
In addition to the Court's inconsistent application of the methods,
aspects of each approach may lead to judicial error. As a proponent of
the overall approach, Advocate General Geelhoed warned that the per-
country approach is too narrow and could lead the Court to faulty con-
clusions:
Examination of the situation of an individual economic op-
erator in the framework of just one of these States—without
taking into account the [EC Treaty] obligations of the other
State—may give an unbalanced and misleading impression,
148 The Court seems to be more inclined to adopt the overall approach in cases involv-
ing tax benefits. See, e.g., Marks & Spencer, 2005 E.C.R. 1-10837, 1 59; Case C-279/93, Finan-
zamt KOln-Altstadt v. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. 1-225, 11 36, 41. For example, the ECJ
seems to want to ensure that certain tax benefits, such as personal exemptions and loss
offsets, are allowed at least once, but no more than once, within the EU. See, e.g., Maths &
Spencer, 2005 E.C.R. 1-10837, I 59. To ensure this kind of treatment, the Court needs to
look at the tax treatment in both states. See, e.g., id. (holding that if the state of a subsidiary
cannot grant tax relief for the subsidiary's losses, then the parent company's state must
allow the loss); Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. 1-225,11 36, 91 (holding that if the residence state
cannot grant personal tax benefits, the source state must).
147 Compare Eurowings, 1999 E.C.R. 1.7447, 11 43-99, with Manninen, 2004 E.C.R. I-
7477,1 54.
148 Compare Case C-204/90, Bachmann v. Belgium, 1992 E.C.R. 1-249, 11 11, 35 (hold-
ing that the host state discriminated on the assumption that the complaining taxpayer's
home state would tax the relevant income, without reference to actual home state law),
with Manninen, 2004 E.C.R. 1-7477, 1 54 (holding that the residence state discriminated in
light of the actual assessment of corporate tax by the source state).
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and may fail to capture the economic reality in which that op-
erator is acting. 149
In Advocate General Geelhoed's vim, the obligations of the source and
residence states must "be seen as a whole, or as achieving a type of equi-
librium."'" By adopting a per-country approach, the Court may ignore
relevant tax treatment in the other member state that bears on whether
the defendant state discriminated. For example, Finland's argument in
Manninen that only domestic, but not inbound, dividends were subject
to economic double taxation may have seemed persuasive until the
Court considered that the corporate profits comprising Manninen's
inbound dividend had already been taxed by Sweden to the distribut-
ing company. 151
In addition to leading the Court to a false conclusion that a
member state did not discriminate, the per-country approach could
also lead the Court to erroneously conclude that the member state
discriminated. For example, by exclusively examining the tax of the
defendant state, the Court could overlook the fact that the defendant
member state arranged for another state to cure the discrimination.
Such bargains might be struck in tax treaties. In deference to member
state tax sovereignty; the Court has held that a member state may shift
its EC tax obligations under such binding legal instruments. 152
Although better than the per-country approach, the overall ap-
proach also suffers certain drawbacks: it allows the Court to get a
broader perspective on the tax situation, but it increases legal uncer-
tainty.'" First, it is more difficult to apply because the Court must con-
149 Test Claimants v. Commis of Inland Revenue, 2006 E.C.R. 1-11673, 1 72 (opinion of
Advocate General Gee!hoed).
150 Id.
1" See Manninen, 2004 E.C.R. I-7477,154.
I" See Case C-379/05, Amurta v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst, 2007 E.C.R. 1-9569,
84 (holding that a source state could shift its obligation to relieve economic double taxa-
tion on cross-border dividends to the shareholder's residence state through a tax treaty);
Case C-385/00, De Groot v. Staatssecretaris van Financier', 2002 E.C.R. 1-11819, 11 99-101
(declaring that where the residence member state has the primary obligation to confer a
tax benefit, that obligation may be shifted to the source state under a tax treaty consis-
tently with EC law).
153 Expressly for this reason, the European Free Trade Association ("EFTA") Court re-
cently refused to adopt the overall approach when analyzing a tax case under the funda-
mental freedoms of the European Economic Area Agreement. Case E-1/04, Fokus Bank
ASA v. Norway, [2005] 1 C.M.L.R. 10, I 37 (Eur. Free Trade Area Ct. 2004). According to
the EFTA Court, "[I-111e principle of legal certainty would require that the granting, or
not, of an imputation tax credit to a nonresident shareholder, may not depend on whether
a tax credit is granted in his or her state of residence in respect of dividend payments." Id.;
see also Gram & Warren, Dividend Taxation in Europe, supra note 93, at 1617.
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sider not only the law of the defendant member state, but also the law
of the other member state, even though that state might not participate
in the proceedings.154 Although all member states have the option to
enter comments on preliminary rulings, they are not compelled to do
so.I 55 Thus, the Court may have to rely on the Commission, the defen-
dant member state, and the taxpayer to accurately describe the tax con-
sequences in the other member state. Any resulting judgment by the
Court would only be reliable to the extent that the parties accurately
described foreign law
Moreover, because the ability of each state to enact tax laws inde-
pendently of the laws of the other states is an important aspect of re-
tained tax competence, each member state's tax law should stand or
fall on its own merits. The determination of whether a member state
discriminates in violation of the EC Treaty should not depend on the
dynamic laws of each of the twenty-six other member states. 156 But un-
der the overall approach, the outcome of cases depends closely on the
tax situation in the other member state. If the Court had adopted an
overall approach in Eurowings, under which it would have considered
the low taxation in Ireland relevant to the discrimination question, it
might have concluded that because a German-Irish lease would bear
less overall tax than a German-German lease, there was no cross-border
disadvantage, and therefore, perhaps, no cross-border discrimination,
even though Germany subjected German-foreign leases to higher taxes
than German-German leases. But suppose a subsequent challenge in-
volved a lessor from a member state with higher taxes than Germany's.
Would the Court now. reach a different result, even though it would be
analyzing the same German lease rule? Likewise, suppose that in Man-
ninen, the company's member state did not have a corporate tax.
Would Finland's rule be constitutional with respect to dividends in-
bound from that member state, but not Sweden? Could the overall ap-
proach result in a situation where the same defendant state's law is dis-
164
 Professor Dennis Weber has called the overall approach "a particularly tedious af-
fair since, as a result of the very sovereignty member states have in taxation, the legislation
of the various member states is difficult to compare and the various types of income are
equally difficult to compare." Weber, supra note 14, at 603.
155 See MASON. supra note 4, at 18-19.
158 When analyzing state tax discrimination under the Commerce Clause, the U.S. Su-
preme Court declined to require a taxpayer to show actual discriminatory impact by point-
ing to a duplicative tax in another U.S. state (in essence, the ECJ's "overall approach")
because then the constitutionality of the accused state's tax law "would depend on the
shifting complexities of the tax codes of 49 other States." ARMCO Inc. v. Hardesty, 467
U.S. 638,644 (1984).
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criminatory with respect to investment in some member states, but not
others?157
If so, the order of decisions by the ECJ might take on paramount
importance. Under the acte clair doctrine, a national court of a member
state is not obliged to refer questions to the ECJ whose answers are
clear. 158
 If the overall approach means that the same tax law could be
discriminatory when applied to cross-border activities in some member
states, but not others, national courts would face uncertainty regarding
whether similar subsequent cases must be referred to the ECJ. For ex-
ample, after Kerckhaert Marres, will a Belgian national court find it
necessary to make another reference to the ECJ when faced with a case
involving inbound dividends not carrying source state imputation cred-
its that compensate for Belgian shareholder taxation? 159 Or should Bel-
gian courts regard the ECJ's decision as completely resolving the issue
of the constitutionality of Belgian dividend taxation?
So far, it appears that national courts unsure of the scope of deci-
sions rendered by the ECJ under the overall approach will make fur-
ther preliminary ruling requests to the Court. For example, France re-
cently amended its domestic tax code to eliminate the shareholder
imputation credit, and a Belgian national court has once again referred
to the ECJ a question concerning whether Belgian tax treatment of divi-
dends inbound from France violates EC law. 16° The second preliminary
ruling request concerns precisely the same Belgian tax laws at issue in
Kerckhaert Co' Morres, and it highlights that, to the extent that the overall
approach depends on the particular tax laws of the other member
state, the approach fails to provide legal certainty. 161
157
 In recent case law, the Court appears to hold that a member state's constitutional
tax obligations depend on the tax situation in the other member state. See Case C-446/04,
Test Claimants in the FII Group Litig. (Franked Investment Income), 2006 E.C.R. 1-11753,
11 53-56; Manninen, 2004 E.C.R. 1-7477, 1 54. In Manninen and the subsequent Franked
Investment Income cases, the Court noted that that the shareholder's residence state could
alter its imputation credit based on the amount of corporate tax to which the inbound
dividend had been subject in the company's state. Sce Franked Investment Income, 2006
E.C.R. I-11753,11 53-56; Manninen, 2004 E.C.R. 1-7477, 1 54 r[T]he calculation of [the)
credit ... must take account of the tax actually paid by the company established in that
other member state . . .."). Contrast this with the view of the U.S. Supreme Court. See Am.
Trucking, 483 U.S. at 288; see also supra note 131.
155 Case G283/81, cum srl v. Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R, 3415,1 21.
159 See Case C-513/04, Kerckhaert & Morres v. Belgium, 2006 E.C.R. 1-10967.
130 Case C-128/08, Jacques Damseaux v. Etat Beige (filed Mar. 28, 2008), available at
http://curia.europa.eu/en/content/juris/index.htm.
151 Id.
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III. THE SOLUTION: THE INTERNAL CONSISTENCY TEST
The internal consistency test provides a solution to the seemingly
intractable choice between the per-country and overall approaches.
The per-country approach gives the ECJ too limited a view of the tax-
payer's situation. And, by requiring the Court to consider the tax situa-
tion in the other member state, the overall approach creates uncer-
tainty and the risk that the same member state's tax provision could
comply with EC law with respect to some member states but not others.
Under the internal consistency test, the Court would consider the tax
law of only a single member state: the defendant. But in order to get
the balanced perspective that comes from considering both source and
residence rules under the overall approach, the Court would hypo-
thetically assume that the defendant state's tax laws applied both in-
bound and outbound. In other words, the Court would apply the de-
fendant state's source rules and the defendant state's residence rules.
Under the internal consistency test, the ECJ would adopt what I
call the "harmony constraint" by assuming that all the member states
apply tax law identical to the defendant member state's. Judicial prece-
dent for the internal consistency test exists in the United States, where
the U.S. Supreme Court uses it to evaluate taxes imposed by U.S. states.
The U.S. Supreme Court asks whether, if all fifty states enacted the
challenged tax rule, interstate commerce would bear a burden that
purely domestic commerce would not also bear. 162 In contrast with what
this Article suggests for the ECJ, the U.S. Supreme Court uses internal
consistency as a standard, rather than a method. 163 Thus, under the
162 See, e.g., Okla, Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995) (de-
scribing the internal consistency approach as applied in the United States). According to
the U.S. Supreme Court,
Eiinternal consistency is preserved when the imposition of a tax identical to
the one in question by every other State would add no burden to interstate
commerce that intra-state commerce would not also bear. This test asks noth-
ing about the economic reality reflected by the tax, but simply looks to the
structure of the tax at issue to see whether its identical application by every
State in the Union would place interstate commerce at a disadvantage com-
pared with intrastate commerce.
Id. (upholding Oklahoma's sales tax on the full price of tickets for interstate bus travel
because . if every state applied the same rule, interstate bus travel would be taxed only by
the state where the ticket was purchased). Internal consistency was first developed by the
Supreme Court for evaluating apportionment claims under the Commerce and Due Proc-
ess Clauses. See, e.g., id.; see also Hellerstein, Internal Consistency L• supra note 29, at 138; Hel-
lerstein, Internal Consistency II, supra note 29, at 4 n.13.
163 See Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 185.
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U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence, a state tax law that lacks internal
consistency is unconstitutional. 164 Later, Part IV discusses the reasons
why internal consistency cannot be used as a tax discrimination stan-
dard in Europe. 165
A. How (and Why) It Works
The internal consistency test exploits the insight that if member
state tax systems were harmonized, there would be no disparities. 166
Thus, any cross-border tax disadvantage that remains after application
of the harmony constraint cannot be due to tax disparities. By provid-
ing the Court a way to filter out cases in which cross-border tax disad-
vantages were caused by disparities, the internal consistency test could
reduce the risk that the Court would infringe member state tax au-
tonomy by striking down disparate cross-border tax rules that it mis-
takes for discriminatory tax rules. It could therefore reduce occur-
rences of what might be called "false positives."
Second, hypothetical harmonization also eliminates positive dis-
parities, in which tax benefits unilaterally offered by one state com-
pensate for the tax discrimination of another. By harmonizing away
the effect of compensatory taxes, the internal consistency test could
also help the ECJ avoid "false negatives," in which the Court fails to
identify tax discrimination due to the absence of a net cross-border
tax disadvantage. Compensatory taxes that obscure tax discrimination
appear to be a rare phenomenon, so the principal virtue of the inter-
nal consistency test is that it highlights which cross-border tax disad-
vantages deserve close scrutiny from the Court under its discrimina-
tion standard.
164 See id. In Jefferson Lines, the Supreme Court held:
A failure of internal consistence shows as a matter of law that a State is attempt-
ing to take more than its fair share of taxes from the interstate transaction,
since allowing such a tax in one State would place interstate commerce at the
mercy of those remaining States that might impose an identical tax.
Id, (emphasis added),
16' See infra notes 199-230 and accompanying text. Despite the intriguing resemblance
between the internal consistency test and Kant's categorical imperative, the inspiration for
this proposal is not Kant's ethics, but rather the U.S. Supreme Court's tax jurisprudence,
including Jefferson Lines. See, e.g., 514 U.S. at 185.1 believe that a logical examination of the
internal consistency test suffices to show its merits in the tax context, without the need to
delve into Kant's philosophy.
166 Recall that the ECJ defines tax disparities as cross-border tax disadvantages stem-
ming from lack of EU-wide tax harmonization. See supra notes 40-61 and accompanying
text.
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B. Identifying Disparate Tax Rates and Tax. Bases
Applying the internal consistency test to the hypothetical tax rate
scenarios presented in Part I of this Article demonstrates its virtues. Re-
call that member state High would discriminate against Mary, a tax-
payer resident in member state Low, if it taxed her at 60% while taxing
its own residents at only 50% . 167 Under the harmony constraint, we
would assume that all the member states would tax their own residents
at 50%, while taxing nonresidents at 60%. In such a situation, EU tax-
payers engaged in cross-border economic activity would always face
higher tax burdens than taxpayers operating wholly domestically. Be-
cause the tax disadvantage persists despite hypothetical harmonization,
it cannot be due to tax disparities, and therefore may result from dis-
crimina don .
Although probative, persistence of the disadvantage under the
harmony constraint does not prove that there was discrimination.'"
The ECJ could find that internally inconsistent member state tax laws
were justified for public policy reasons, or it could find that the cross-
border and internal situations were so dissimilar that the member state
was not required to treat them the same. As a result, although a failure
of internal consistency tends to suggest discrimination, it is not suffi-
cient to establish a violation of EC law. Thus, rather than constituting a
per se violation of the EC Treaty, a failure of internal consistency
should be understood to create a rebuttable presumption of discrimi-
nation.
The internal consistency test also confirms that tax rate differen-
tials, if uniformly applied, represent disparities, not discrimination.'"
Again suppose that member state High's tax rate is 50% while member
state Low's rate is 25%, but now assume that both states apply that rate
uniformly to both residents and nonresidents. As noted in Part I, Mary
would face a higher tax rate in High than she would on similar invest-
ments or activities in Low.ro Thus, she would suffer a tax disadvantage
on her cross-border economic activities that she would not face on
purely domestic activities. If she challenged High's 50% rate, however,
and the Court applied the internal consistency test, the Court would
assume that every member state had the same 50% tax rate as High.
Under hypothetical harmonization, Mary would be taxed at 50% in
167 See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
168 See infra notes 206-210 and accompanying text.
169 See supra notes 74-116 and accompanying text.
170 See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
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both Low and High, and the cross-border tax disadvantage would dis-
appear. Disappearance of the cross-border tax disadvantage under the
harmony constraint shows that the disadvantage was due to lack of
harmonization between the tax laws of High and Low and therefore
stemmed from a disparity, not discrimination by High. Because the ECJ
has stated that disadvantages caused by disparities are not discrimina-
tory, determining that a cross-border tax advantage was due to a dispar-
ity would dispose of the discrimination question. 171
The same result would occur if either the German or the Austrian
system for taxing alimony were universalized. In the example reviewed
in Part I, alimony paid by an Austrian payer to a German recipient
could be subject to tax in both Austria and Germany due to disparities
in those states' tax systems. 172
 The challenge for the ECJ was to recog-
nize that this cross-border tax disadvantage stemmed from disparity,
rather than discrimination.'" Analysis under the harmony constraint
makes this conclusion more obvious. Suppose that the alimony recipi-
ent resides in Germany and challenges German taxation of the receipt
of the alimony on the grounds that Austria already included the ali-
mony in the payer's income when earned (without allowing a deduc-
tion for the alimony payment). Under the harmony constraint, we as-
sume all member states would adopt the German system for taxing
alimony: they would allow the payer a deduction and include the ali-
mony in the income of the recipient. Under this hypothetical assump-
tion, Austria (applying German law) would allow the alimony payer a
deduction, and Germany would include the alimony in the income of
the recipient, resulting in only a single tax. 174 Disappearance of the tax
disadvantage under the harmony constraint shows that the disadvan-
tage derives from lack of harmonization rather than discrimination.
Once the ECJ has a reliable way to determine when cross-border tax
"I See, e.g., Case C-336/96, Gilly v. Directeur des Services Eiscaux du Bas-Rhin, 1998
E.C.R. 1-2793, 49,53 (holding that a cross-border tax disadvantage due to tax rate dis-
parities was not discrimination). There could still be a question of whether the member
state violated EC law by imposing a nondiscriminatory restriction on intra-Community
commerce. See infra notes 201-210 and accompanying text.
173 See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
173 See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
174 Notice also that if the payer sued Austria, the ECJ would universalize the Austrian
rule, such that Austria would include the alimony in the payer's income and disallow any
deduction, while Germany (now hypothetically applying Austrian law) would exempt the
alimony from the income of the recipient. Again, there would be only a single layer of tax
on the cross-border alimony payment. The fact that each state's rule, if universalized,
would result in no cross-border tax disadvantage shows that the tax disadvantage experi-
enced by the complaining taxpayer results from disparity, not discrimination.
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disadvantages are caused by disparities, it can give disparities deference,
thereby also deferring to member states' tax autonomy.
One might object to the notion that, because they adopt dispa-
rate schemes for taxing alimony, both Austria and Germany may tax
the same item of income without offering any relief for the other
state's tax. Obviously, the imposition of tax by two member states on
the same item of income hampers cross-border economic activity, and
therefore does not promote Community integration goals. Thus, it
would be desirable for member states to ensure that their autono-
mously drafted regulations and tax laws do not create conflicts with
those of other states. But states' failure to coordinate their tax systems
does not constitute discrimination.
The Court has handled nondiscriminatory barriers to market inte-
gration, such as failure to coordinate regulatory schemes with those of
other states, under its "restriction" analysis.' 75 The distinction between
the ECJ's conceptions of discrimination and restriction is analogous to
the distinction drawn by the U.S. Supreme Court in its Dormant Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence between discrimination and "undue bur-
dens."176 Although state regulation that discriminates against interstate
trade is virtually invalid per se under the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, nondiscriminatory regulation may also violate the prohi-
bition on "undue burdens" on interstate trade.'" As with American ju-
risprudence, it is important to conceptually distinguish these two
strains of European jurisprudence because the ECJ's standard of review
for each differs. Although discrimination is virtually invalid per se in
Europe, more public policy exceptions may be available to justify non-
discriminatory restrictions.' 78 Moreover, the ECJ has thus far shown re-
luctance to apply restriction reasoning in tax cases, perhaps out of def-
erence to member state tax autonomy. 179
C. Indentibing Discriminatory and Compensatory Taxation
It may seem obvious that national differences in tax rates or the
selection of the person taxable on alimony do not constitute discrimi-
nation, at least in a system that does not require harmonization of tax
175 See infra notes 201-210 and accompanying text.
175 See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520,529-30 (1959).
177 See id. (invalidating under the Dormant Commerce Clause a nondiscriminatory
state mudguard regulation that differed from the mudguard regulations of forty-five other
states).
178 See infra notes 201-210 and accompanying text.
179 See Kofler & Mason, supra note 109, at 70-71.
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rates and tax bases. But applying the internal consistency test to the
difficult case of cross-border economic double tax relief shows that the
test aids in the consideration of complex and non-obvious tax cases.
Recall that in In re Manninen, decided by the EC.) in 2004, Finland
taxed resident shareholders and resident companies, but it granted
shareholder imputation credits only on dividends from resident com-
panies. 188 If we assumed under the harmony constraint that every mem-
ber state employed Finland's tax rules, corporate profits would always
be taxed at both the corporate and shareholder levels, resulting in eco-
nomic double taxation. Only domestic dividends, however, would be
entitled shareholder imputation credits that relieved the shareholder
level tax; cross-border dividends would remain subject to unrelieved
economic double taxation. 181
Thus, the internal consistency test shows that the tax disadvan-
tage at issue in Man ninen did not stem from disparities between the
Finnish and Swedish tax systems. Rather, the economic double taxa-
tion of dividends inbound to Finland would persist even if every other
member state applied the exact same tax law as Finland. 182 The persis-
tence of systematic disadvantageous tax treatment for cross-border
dividends in the face of hypothetical harmonization in Manninen
tends to suggest that Finland discriminated against cross-border divi-
18° Case C.319/02, 2004 E.C.R. 1-7477,	 6-11; see alto supra notes 134-142 and ac-
companying text.
161 The following table summarizes how $100 in corporate profits would be treated
when distributed to domestic and cross-border shareholders if every member state
adopted the Finnish tax regime, as described in Manninen:
Domestic Dividend Cross-Border Dividend
a. Corporate profit 100 100
b. Corporate tax (30%) (30) (30)
c. Dividend 70 70
d. Shareholder tax (30%) (21) (21)
e. Shareholder imputation credit 0
f. Net shareholder tax (d plus e) 0 (21)
g,	 Total EU tax burden (b plus f) 30 51
The table shows that failing to grant shareholder imputation credits to cross-border
dividends systematically disfavors them as compared to domestic dividends. Note that this
example simplifies several aspects of the case, including by using round tax rates and ig-
noring gross-up issues and source state withholding. For more a precise numerical exam-
ple, see Lari Ilintsanen & Kennet Petterssoit, The Implications of the ECJ Holding the Denial of
Finnish Imputation Credits in Cross-Border Situations to Be Incompatible with the EC Treaty in the
Manninen Case, 45 EUR.TAX't4 130,135-37 (2005).
l a2 See supra note 181.
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dends, and that the 'ECJ should closely scrutinize Finland's exclusion
of inbound dividends from economic double tax relief.
In this way, the harmony constraint gives the Court an overall'
(source and residence) perspective on how the income will be taxed,
without requiring the Court to delve into the specifics of the tax laws
of other member states. When the Court assumes that all twenty-seven
member states have the same law as the defendant member state, only
one state's law matters: that of the defendant. This means that in Man-
ninen, when evaluating the compatibility of Finnish residence rules
with EC law, the ECJ would apply Finnish source rules instead of
Swedish source rules. This is helpful in at least two ways. First, because
Finland would participate in the case, the Court is more likely to get
an accurate report of Finnish tax law than Swedish tax law. Second, by
eliminating Swedish law from the inquiry, the Court would avoid the
risk that interactions between particular Swedish source rules and
particular Finnish residence rules create the appearance of discrimi-
nation (for example, because there was a disparity that created a
nondiscriminatory cross-border tax disadvantage) or obscure dis-
crimination (for example, because Sweden compensated for Finland's
discrimination). It thus should eliminate the risk that the same chal-
lenged tax law could be EC law-compliant with respect to some states
but not others.
Thus, in addition to helping identify when disadvantages are due
to disparities, because the harmony constraint simplifies the factual and
legal situation under review, the internal consistency test may also help
reduce errors in which the ECJ fails to discover discrimination because
the tax disadvantage is hidden or otherwise compensated by the tax
rules of the other state. 185 The test accomplishes this without introduc-
ing as much uncertainty as the overall approach. 184
Recall that in the 2006 Kerchhaert & Morres case, adverse tax treat-
ment by Belgium of inbound dividends was obscured by special tax
benefits offered by France on outbound dividends. 185 France took the
somewhat unusual step of granting shareholder imputation credits to
foreign shareholders. 186 The imputation credit was sufficiently gener-
ous that even after the application of both French and Belgian taxa-
tion, the shareholders still paid less tax overall on dividends from a
"33 See supra notes 99-111 and accompanying text.
184 See supra notes 147-159 and accompanying text.
lea See Ca sr C-513/04, 2006 E.C.R. 1-10967,11 9-12; see also supra notes 99-111 and ac-
companying text.
Lea See Kerckhaert Morres, 2006 E.C.R. 1-10967,11 9-12.
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French company than they would have paid on Belgian dividends. 187 In
his opinion in the case, Advocate General Geelhoed argued that the
absence of a net cross-border disadvantage was dispositive: if there was
no net tax disadvantage, there was no discrimination. 188
Yet, had the Advocate General applied the harmony constraint, he
would have assumed that Belgian law would apply both inbound and
outbound. Because Belgium did not grant imputation credits to foreign
shareholders, there would have been no compensatory tax benefit to
obscure the adverse effects of Belgian taxation, and he would have
been able to see that Belgian law created a net cross-border tax disad-
vantage whenever credits from the source state failed to compensate for
Belgian tax. 188 Again, the persistence (or in this case, the appearance)
of a cross-border tax disadvantage under the harmony constraint does
not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Belgium discriminated. The
Advocate General still might have concluded that Belgium did not dis-
criminate, but in that case Belgium would have had to offer arguments
explaining why the cross-border tax disadvantage did not constitute
discrimination. Logically, the absence of a net cross-border tax disad-
vantage should not constitute a valid defense of the Belgian tax scheme
because the absence of a cross-border tax disadvantage in Kerckhaert's
and Morres' case was due to unilateral conferral of a tax credit by
France, not any mitigating action by Belgium.
D. An American Solution to a European Problem?
Those familiar with state taxation in the United States may be
amazed at the claim that anything helpful could be wrested from the
U.S. Supreme Court's constitutional tax jurisprudence, which by the
Court's own description is a "quagmire" and "tangled underbrush."'"
But the Supreme Court's troubles with tax discrimination stem princi-
pally from an ever-changing series of standards, not from use of the in-
ternal consistency test. Indeed, the internal consistency test is a rare
oasis of logical rigor in an area otherwise aptly characterized as "con-
187
 Id. 1[ 26-27 (opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed).
la° Id.
199 For a numerical example, see supra note 109 and accompanying text.
19° Sec Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1959); see
also Wardair Canada Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 17 (1986) (Burger, C.f., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment) (referring to the cloudy waters of this
Court's 'dormant Commerce Clause' doctrine").
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fused."191 As long as the ECJ does not import the profusion of conflict-
ing U.S. judicial standards for tax discrimination along with the inter-
nal consistency test, it should be able to avoid the major pitfalls of the
U.S. jurisprudence.
It is not surprising that a test developed by the U.S. Supreme
Court for its state tax discrimination cases would also work for Euro-
pean tax discrimination cases because the problem of overlapping
taxation exists in both jurisdictions. Crucially, both the U.S. Supreme
Court and the ECJ have held that cross-border tax disadvantages due
to tax disparities do not violate constitutional prohibitions on tax dis-
crimination. 192 Thus, even if the American and European judicial
standards for discrimination are not otherwise coextensive, the carve-
out for disparities in each jurisdiction means that the internal consis-
tency test can be applied in both places. 193
Practical and structural differences between U.S. state taxation and
EU member state taxation mean that the internal consistency test could
be even more useful to the ECJ than to the U.S. Supreme Court. First,
the stakes are higher in Europe than they are in the United States for at
least two reasons. Member state income taxes represent a higher pro-
191 See Tracy A. Kaye, Tax Discrimination: A Comparative Analysis of U.S. and EU Ap-
pmachar, 7 FLA. TAX Rev. 47, 56 (2005).
State tax expert Professor Walter Hellerstein, although unconvinced that the internal
consistency test added anything new to stale tax discrimination standards previously eluci-
dated by the U.S. Supreme Court, noted that "[a]s a matter of theory, it is difficult to quar-
rel with the proposition that the commerce clause forbids taxes that penalize taxpayers
merely because they do business across state lines. And the 'internal consistency' doctrine
may be viewed as a logical corollary to that proposition." Hellerstein, Internal Consistency I,
supra note 29, at 164. Recently, the Supreme Court seems to have narrowed the applica-
tion of the internal consistency approach. See Hellerstein, Internal Consistency II, supra note
29, at 44-45 (analyzing American Trucking Ass'ns v. Michigan Public Service Commission, 545
U.S. 429 (2005), and concluding that internal consistency remains a relevant constitu-
tional standard).
191 See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 278 n.12 (1978) (refusing to strike
down Iowa's apportionment formula, even though the fact that Iowa's apportionment
formula differed from Illinois's formula could result in double taxation of interstate com-
merce, because the tax disadvantage was due to "disparity"); Case C403/03, Schempp v.
Finanzamt Munchen, 2005 E.C.R. 1-6421, 1 34 (refusing to find discrimination where dis-
parate impact resulted from differences in two member states' tax treatment of cross-
border alimony payments).
193 In my view, and in the view of other commentators, the U.S. and EU substantive
conceptions of tax discrimination are indeed remarkably similar, although that is not nec-
essary for the internal consistency test to work in both jurisdictions. See Hellerstein et al.,
supra note 101 (comparing constitutional restraints on corporate tax integration in each
jurisdiction); Kaye, supra note 191, at 111-31 (comparing U.S. Supreme Court and ECJ tax
cases); Mason, supra note 45, at 120-28 (comparing normative justifications for U.S. and
EU bans on tax discrimination).
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portion of taxpayer's overall tax burden in Europe than do state taxes
in the United States.'" Also, market distortions from cross-border tax
differences (whether caused by discriminatory taxes or nondiscrimina-
tory disparities) are less significant in the United States than in Europe
because U.S. states generally use the federal tax base as a starting poian
for their tax assessments.t 95 This means that the tax bases of U.S. states
are harmonized to a much greater extent than those of EU member
states.
Second, application of the internal consistency test in the United
States fails to capitalize on one of its principal virtues: that it elimi-
nates the need to consider the source rules of one state in light of the
residence rules of another state. This is because, for business taxation,
U.S. states generally do not apply source and residence tax rules.' 56
Instead, they allocate most taxable income according to the formulary
apportionment method." 7 Under this method, a taxpayer's total ac-
194 U.S. taxpayers' federal income tax burden exceeds their state income tax burden
because state tax rates are low compared to federal rates, and states apply their rates to tax
bases similar to the federal tax base. There is no EC-level income taxation in Europe, so
Europeans' tax burden consists primarily of national income taxes and value-added taxes.
OECD WORLD FACTBOOK 179-80 (2005).
199 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION 1 7 (3d ed.
1999 & Supp. 2007) (business taxation); id.1 20 (personal taxation).
106
 See id. I 7.02.
197 See generally Hellerstein et al., supra note 101. The U.S. states allocate personal in-
come according to source and residence rules, but the dominant method for business
income is formulary apportionment, and only certain types of income not related to the
taxpayers' business operations (e.g., portfolio interest and dividends) are taxed on a resi-
dence basis when they are not constitutionally subject to apportionment. See id. The
method employed by the EU member states, using source and residence rules, is called the
"arm's-length" or "separate accounting" method. See generally id. Formulary apportionment
has been proposed for the EU under the name "common consolidated corporate tax base"
("CCCTB"). See, e.g., Commission Working Paper on Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base,
CCCTB: Possible Elements of a Technical Outline (CCCTB/WP/057) ( July 26, 2007), available
at http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_custonas/resourcesidocuments/taxation/company  tax/
common_tax_base/CCCTBWP057_en.pdf; see also Communication from the Commission to the
Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee: Tackling the
Corporation Tax Obstacles of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in the Internal Market—Outline
of a Possible Home State Taxation Pilot Scheme, at 8, COM (2005) 702 final (Dec. 23, 2005)
[hereinafter Tackling the Corporation Taxi. For more on the formulary apportionment and
arm's-length methods, see MECHAM J. GRAETZ, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME
TAXATION 400-21 (2003). For the EU proposal, see, for example, Tackling the Corporation
Tax, supra, at 8. For a proposal that the United States unilaterally move from separate ac-
counting to formulary apportionment for taxing the income of multi-national enterprises,
See REUVEN S. Avt-YoNAtt & KIMBERLY A. CLAUSING, HAMILTON PROJECT DISCUSSION PA-
PER No. 2007-08, REFORMING CORPORATE TAXATION IN A GLOBAL EcoNostv: A PROPOSAL
1 ADOPT FORMULARY APPORTIONMENT 5 (2007), available at hup://www.brookings.edu/
–/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/06corporatetaxes_clausing/200706clausing_aviyonah.pdf.
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Live business income, wherever derived, is divided among the U.S.
states according to the presence of factors of production in each
state. 198
IV. LIMITATIONS OF THE INTERNAL CONSISTENCY TEST
The internal consistency test represents a significant improve-
ment on the methods currently used by the ECJ and those suggested
by commentators, but it has certain limitations, which are discussed in
this Part.
A. Reprise: A Methodology, Not a Standard
Although the internal consistency test addresses the major analyti-
cal problems caused by overlapping taxation, it does not, by itself; dis-
pose of tax cases. A challenged member state tax law that "passes" the
internal consistency test is notmecessarily EC law-compliant. When a tax
disadvantage passes the internal consistency test, the proper conclusion
is that it was caused by a disparity. 199 This is useful information for the
ECJ because disparities are not discriminatory.2" Nonetheless, theoreti-
cally, a nondiscriminatory disparity could violate EC law if it "restricts"
intim-Community commerce."'
The ECJ has never held a nondiscriminatory tax law to constitute
such a restriction, but it has found non-tax regulations to constitute
nondiscriminatory restrictions. 202 A restriction approach in tax cases
would allow the Court to scrutinize cases in which member states "fix"
discrimination in their tax codes by extending the application of the
disadvantageous law to domestic taxpayers. Germany employed this
approach when the ECJ held that German thin capitalization rules vio-
'BB See, e.g., UNIFORM DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT § 9 (1957). These
factors generally include some combination of sales, payroll, and property. See id. (recom-
mending equal weighing of those factors).
199 Ste supra notes 169-174 and accompanying text.
200 See id.; see also supra notes 74-98 and accompanying text.
20' Cf. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung ffir Branntwien
(Cassis de Dijon), 1979 E.C.R. 649,1 15.
2°2 See id. The distinction between discrimination and restriction in the EU is similar to
that drawn by the U.S. Supreme Court under the Commerce Clause between discrimina-
tion and undue burdens. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520,529-30
(1959) (invalidating a nondiscriminatory state mudguard regulation that differed from
the mudguard regulations of forty-five other states because it constituted an undue burden
on interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause); see also Kofler & Mason, supra note
109, at 94-96 (comparing the EU concept of restrictions with the U.S. concept of undue
burdens).
1320	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 49:1277
lated the EC Treaty because they applied only to German subsidiaries
owned by foreign parent companies. 203 Rather than repeal its thin capi-
talization rules, Germany amended its law to extend the restrictive leg-
islation to German subsidiaries of German parents. 2D4 Although apply-
ing the restrictive rule equally to resident and nonresident taxpayers
may remove the discrimination, it keeps in place the restriction, which
may disproportionately burden nonresident taxpayers. A robust con-
ception of prohibited tax restrictions would take into account the dis-
proportionate effect of facially neutral member state tax legislation.
It is uncertain whether the ECJ will apply a restriction analysis in
future tax cases, and this Article offers no opinion on that question. 203
Adoption of a restriction approach to tax cases, however, might lead
the Court to conclude that some disparities, although not discrimina-
tory, nevertheless violate EC law by inhibiting cross-border commerce.
The possibility that disparities might violate EC law would mean that
"passing" the internal consistency test would not immunize a member
state's law from EC law challenges.
Likewise, a failure of internal consistency does not lead inexora-
bly to the conclusion that the member state discriminated. Failure of
internal consistency shows only that the disadvantage does not derive
from disparities. But not all such disadvantages are discriminatory.
For example, they could be justified by differences in the situations of
cross-border and internal taxpayers. 206 Or they could be justified for
public policy reasons, such as the need to prevent tax fraud. 207 Thus,
20!
	
Case C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v. Finanzamt Steinfurt, 2002 E.C.R. I-
11779, 1 44.
2" Otmar ThOmmes, Commission's Reluctance and Member States' Overreactions —A Perfect
Recipe for Chaos, 32 lwriEtroix 124, 125 (2004).
205 The ECJ has used restriction language in tax cases that also involved discrimination.
See, e.g., Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer plc v. Halsey, 2005 E.C.R. 1-10837, 11 28-34
(holding that the United Kingdom's refusal to offset British income with losses of foreign
subsidiaries in cases where those foreign losses could not be taken in the subsidiary's state
restricted the British parent's freedom of establishment); cf. Case C-250/95, Futuna Par-
ticipations SA v. Administration des Contributions, 1997 E.C.R. 12471,1 43 (holding that a
nondiscriminatory tax accounting burden placed on nonresidents to keep an extra copy of
their books in the host state was restrictive). For commentary on the ECJ's restriction ap-
proach in tax rases, see Axel Cordewener, The Prohibitions of Discrimination and Restriction
Within the Framework of the Fully Integrated Internal Market, in EU FREEDOMS AND TAXATION
(Frans Vanistendael ed., 2006) (concluding that the Court's tax restriction cases could be
recast as discrimination cases); Graetz Be Warren, supra note 14, at 1199; Mason, supra note
14, at 91-95; Frans Vanistendael, The Compatibility of the Basic Economic Freedoms with the Sov-
ereign National Tax Systems of the Member States, 12 EC TAX REV. 136, 137-38 (2003).
206 See generally MASON, supra note 4.
207 See id. at 93-114,
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failure of internal consistency does not necessarily lead to the conclu-
sion that there has been tax discrimination beCause that conclusion
depends on how the ECJ defines tax discrimination. 208
As a result, the internal consistency test does not eliminate the
need for the ECJ to apply its standard for discrimination in tax cases.
Therefore, if the ECJ's tax discrimination standard suffers from defects,
those defects would not be resolved by the internal consistency tes1 209
Adoption of the internal consistency test, however, should not produce
new flaws in the standard—any such flaws are independent of the selec-
tion of a methodology to address the overlapping tax dilemma.
If the ultimate effect of the internal consistency test is that the
Court applies its discrimination standard more often,210 the internal
consistency test could make any defects in the Court's standard more
pronounced. On the other hand, to the extent that the internal con-
sistency test filters out cases of disparity; to which the ECJ need not
apply discrimination analysis, then use of the test would lead the
Court to apply its discrimination standard less often, thereby minimiz-
ing the impact of any defects in the discrimination standard. In either
case, any problems with the discrimination standard applied by the
ECJ are independent of its approach to the overlapping tax dilemma,
be it internal consistency, per-country, or overall.
B. Fixing the Counterfactual Antecedents
The internal consistency test might be criticized for being hypo-
thetical. 2" The harmony constraint does not obtain in reality, so the
Court must engage in counterfactual reasoning. How should the Court
determine the scope of the counterfactual? What, precisely, does it
mean to assume that all the other member states apply the challenged
rule? Under the harmony constraint, is the challenged tax rule defined
as narrowly as possible, and then universalized to all the other states?
What else about the other states' tax systems would also have to change
"a For critical evaluation of the standard applied by the ECG in tax discrimination
cases, see, for example, Graetz & Warren, supra note 14.
tae
	 I have elsewhere criticized the Court's tax discrimination standard, see gen-
erally Mason, supra note 45, such criticism is not the goal of this Article.
210 This could happen if, under internal consistency, the Court applies its discrimina-
tion standard in cases it previously would have erroneously concluded were disparities or
in cases where the other member state compensated for the discrimination.
2" Cf. Hellerstein, Internal Consistency I, supra note 29, at 143, 165 (criticizing the U.S.
version of internal consistency for being hypothetical, but not citing any adverse conse-
quences that derive from the hypothetical nature of the test).
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to make the counterfactual true? Or does the harmony constraint
mean something broader, for example that every member state should
be assumed to have all the same tax laws as the defendant member
state? The problem of fixing the counterfactual antecedents could rein-
troduce some of the uncertainty seen in the overall approach. 212
The U.S. experience shows, however, that fixing the counterfac-
tual antecedents has not posed a serious problem. 213 Additionally, the
ECJ's tax rulings are already significantly hypothetical. 214 The ECJ
does not sit as an appellate court in tax cases; rather, it answers pre-
liminary questions referred by national courts faced with tax issues
touching upon EC law. 215 The preliminary ruling procedure necessar-
ily results in abstract analysis by the ECJ, which posits a stylized com-
plaining taxpayer and compares that taxpayer to a stylized internal
taxpayer. 216
The benefits of the internal consistency test more than compen-
sate for the increase in abstraction in an already quite abstract process.
Although the scope of the harmony constraint might be subject to de-
bate, and commentators may disagree as to whether it was applied cor-
rectly in a particular case, at least it is a more transparent and reliable
methodology than the per-country and overall approaches currently
employed by the Court. 217
C. Not Applicable in Most Favored Nation Cases
A minor shortcoming of the internal consistency test is that it can-
not easily be applied to cases in which the taxpayer argues that the EC
Treaty implies a most favored nation obligation. 215 Taxpayers raise most
favored nation claims when a member state grants better treatment
(usually in a tax treaty) to residents of one member state than to resi-
212
 Philosophers have long contemplated the counterfactual antecedent problem. See,
e.g., NELSON GOODMAN, FACT, Fiction AND FORECAST 16 (1979).
21/ See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995).
214 See Case C-204/90, Bachmann v. Belgium, 1992 E.C.R. 1-249, 111 11, 35 (assuming
member states have a given tax policy).
216 See ANNUAL REPORT 2006, supra note 23, at 90. Of the thirty-four new tax cases
listed in the 2006 Annual Report, twenty-seven were references for a preliminary ruling
and seven were direct actions. Id.
216 For criticism of the ECJ's "comparable internal situation test," see generally Mason,
supra note 45.
217 See supra notes 122-145 and accompanying text.
218 See, e.g., Case C-376/03, D. v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst, 2005 E.C.R. 1-5821,
1 63.
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dents of another. 219 Thus, rather than preferring its own residents to
nonresidents, the member state prefers some nonresidents to other
nonresidents. Because the criterion for granting the tax preference in
these cases is nationality, or a proxy for nationality such as tax resi-
dence, they raise nationality discrimination concerns. 22° But a national
rule that says "nonresidents from Greece will be taxed more favorably
than nonresidents from Italy" is not susceptible to universalization. 22 '
How would the harmony constraint be applied in Greece? In Italy?
Arguably, the fact that a member state's rule cannot be universal-
ized is itself evidence that it is discriminatory, although such discrimi-
nation could be justified by differences between taxpayers of different
states, or for public policy reasons, such as the need to limit reciprocal
benefits secured in bilateral tax treaties to the parties to the treaty.
Nevertheless, the inapplicability of the internal consistency test to
most favored nation cases probably does not represent a significant
shortcoming because the Court already held in the 2005 case D. v.
Inspecteur van de Belastinglienst that the EC Treaty does not imply a
most favored nation requirement for member state tax treaties. 222 If it
is true, however, that the inability to universalize a member state tax
law is probative of its discriminatory character, then the Court should
have subjected the tax treaty provision in D. to heightened scrutiny.
D. Embedded Conditional Language
A final criticism of the internal consistency test is that it is game-
able by the member states. Suppose Spain granted Spanish taxpayers a
certain tax benefit, but it would only grant nonresident taxpayers the
benefit if all other member states granted Spanish taxpayers the same
benefit. By conditioning similar treatment for nonresidents on the de-
mand for EU-wide reciprocity, has Spain satisfied the internal consis-
tency test? The answer appears to be yes: when the Spanish rule is uni-
versalized under the harmony constraint, the condition for Spain to
grant benefits to nonresidents is fulfilled, so residents and nonresidents
would both receive benefits. Under ordinary conditions, however, the
reciprocity requirement might not be satisfied, and nonresidents would
be denied the tax benefit.
2" See, e.g., id.
2" See, e.g., id.
"I I realize that no national law is phrased in these terms, but having different tax
treaty terms for nationals of different member states could be functionally equivalent to
my phrasing.
222 See D., 2005 E.C.R. 1-5821, 1 63.
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Before concluding that it is not necessary to worry about this
rather obvious form of manipulation, consider the 1981 U.S. Supreme
Court case Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equali-
zation of California.225 There, California imposed a "retaliatory" tax on
out-of-state insurance companies operating in California, but only if
the company's home state imposed a similar tax on California insur-
ers doing business in that state. 224 The Supreme Court held that con-
ditioning favorable tax treatment for out-of-state insurers upon recip-
rocal treatment of California companies by other states did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause. 225 In a subsequent case, the Court ex-
plained its reasoning in Western & Southern: California did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause because its "purpose in enacting the re-
taliatory tax—to promote interstate business of domestic insurers by
deterring other States from enacting discriminatory or excessive
taxes—was a legitimate one."225 Thus, under the Equal Protection
Clause, the motivation for the state's reciprocity requirement served
as important factor for determining its constitutionality.
The ECJ's attitude towards tax reciprocity requirements has been
mixed.227 Early on in its jurisprudence, the ECJ rejected member states'
arguments that reciprocal tax arrangements, including those formal-
ized in tax treaties, should be immune from scrutiny under the nondis-
crimination standard. 228 Instead, the Court held in several cases that
member states were required to extend on a unilateral basis tax bene-
223 451 U.S. 648 (1981).
224 Id. at 650.
225 Id.
226 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 876-77 (1985) (citing Western Co' South-
ern, 451 U.S. at 668) (distinguishing California's tax in Western & Southern from a higher
tax rate imposed by Alabama on premiums paid to out-of-state insurers). The Supreme
Court's holding in Western  & Southern is attributable to the standard of review applied in
the case. The Court did not analyze California's tax under the Dormant Commerce Clause
because Congress consented to state regulation of insurance under the McCarran-
Ferguson Act. See id. at 880. Thus, California's tax was given only rational basis review un-
der the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 881. In contrast, when the Supreme Court con-
sidered a discriminatory tax with an element of reciprocity under the Commerce Clause, it
struck the tax down. See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 280 (1988)
(striking down as discriminatory an Ohio ethanol credit that was limited to ethanol pro-
duced in Ohio or in other states that granted Ohio ethanol producers a similar credit).
227 Compare Case C-307/97, Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, Zweigniederlassung Deutsch-
land V. Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt, 1999 E.C.R. 1-6161,11 55-63, with D., 2005 E.C.R. I-
5821, 1 63.
228 See Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, 1999 E.C.R. I-6161,11 55-63.
2008]	 Made in America for European Tax: The Internal Consistency Test 	 1325
his previously bestowed to nonresidents only on a reciprocal basis. 229
But more recently, the ECJ rejected the argument that the EC Treaty
implied a general most favored nation requirement for tax treaties. 239
The rarity of such reciprocal (or retaliatory) taxes in the United
States, despite the Supreme Court's use of the internal consistency test,
suggests that the risk that states will game the test is not significant.
Nevertheless, if the member states gamed the internal consistency test
by embedding conditional language in their tax laws, the ECJ could
find such provisions to violate EC law because they constitute imper-
missible "restrictions" on intra-Community commerce, even though
hypothetical harmonization shows that they are technically disparities.
In the alternative, such conditional language could be deleted from the
statute before it is universalized under the internal consistency test to
approximate the result of the rule in cases where the condition is un-
fulfilled.
CONCLUSION
As the number of tax cases in the European Court of Justice in-
creases, the need to address problems created for the Court by over-
lapping taxation of cross-border income becomes more urgent. This
Article argues that the internal consistency test would help prevent
two kinds of judicial errors in tax discrimination cases. One type of
error occurs when the ECJ fails to recognize that cross-border disad-
vantages arise from disparities, not discrimination; another type oc-
curs when the ECJ fails to discover discrimination because compensa-
tory taxes in one state obscure the cross-border tax disadvantage
caused by another state's discrimination.
Respect for member state fiscal sovereignty requires the Court to
avoid the first type of error, the false positive. By entering into the EC
Treaty; the member states agreed not to use their tax systems to dis-
criminate against nationals of other member states, but the states re-
tained autonomy over the substantive aspects of their tax systems, such
as the ability to set tax rates and define tax bases.231
 When the ECJ mis-
takes disparity for discrimination, it exceeds its institutional compe-
tence by invalidating tax laws that are not inconsistent with the EC
22° See, e.g., id. (holding that a member state must grant to permanent establishments
or EU companies benefits equivalent to those available under tax treaties to resident com-
panies).
23° D., 2005 E.C.R. 1-58211 63.
231 See, e.g., Case C-336/96, Gilly v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux du Bas-Rhin, 1998
E.C.R. 1-2793, ¶124, 30, 34, 46, 48.
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Treaty, thereby unnecessarily narrowing the member states' methods
for raising revenue and accomplishing tax policy objectives. 232 As the
debate over whether the ECJ should retain jurisdiction to review tax
cases shows, the member states recognize and resist such judicial en-
croachment on their tax powers.233 By supplying the ECJ a reliable
method to determine whether a cross-border tax disadvantage was
caused by disparities between the two states' tax systems, the internal
consistency test would help the Court show national tax laws proper
deference.
The internal consistency test also would help the ECJ avoid the
second type of error, the false negative, by highlighting when com-
pensatory taxes offered by one member state obscure discrimination
by another member state. Respect for the rights of EC taxpayers and
promotion of European economic integration and tax competition
depend on the Court's ability to recognize and censure even obscure
cases of tax discrimination.
Finally, the internal consistency test provides an elegant solution to
what seemed to be the intractable problem of whether the ECJ should
adopt the per-country or overall approach in tax cases. it gives the ECJ
a broad (source and residence) perspective on cross-border tax situa-
tions without requiring the Court to discover (or speculate about) the
tax laws of any member state other than the defendant. The ECJ's
growing tendency to look at the tax situation in other member states is
both perilous and inappropriate. it is perilous because it adds complex-
ity and therefore increases the probability of error, and it is inappropri-
ate because the legality of one member state's tax law should not be
determined with respect to another's. A member state should not be
able to justify its own tax discrimination by pointing to an offsetting ad-
vantage enjoyed by the taxpayer in his or her home state.
252 See, e.g., Graetz & Warren, supra note 14, at 1208-13 (criticizing the demise, via de-
cisions by the EC', of shareholder imputation in Europe).
235 See Vanistendael, supra note 15, at 413.
